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LABOR LAW 
I. LOCAL UNION AFFAIRS AND THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Stelling v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers Local Union Number 1547, I the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court of Alaska2 in a suit filed against a 
local union (Local 1547 or the Local), the International Union 
(International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (lBEW)), and 
various union officers.3 The complaint by local members first 
sought district court enforcement of a pJ'ovision of the union 
constitution that plaintiffs claimed required a membership vote 
on a new agreement negotiated by the International President. 
The district court dismissed this part of the complaint on the 
grounds that it had no authority to enforce union con~titutions;4 
the Ninth Circuit agreed, but for somewhat different reasons.S 
Second, the complaint attempted to show a breach of fiduciary 
responsibility to members by various union officials. The Ninth 
Circuit concurred in the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment against plaintiffs on this portion of their complaint, finding 
that the duty did exist but was not breached. e The district court 
also discussed the plaintiffs' failure to join the employer group, 
and dismissed the injunctive prayer, finding the employer group 
an indispensible party.7 The Ninth Circuit never reached this 
issue, finding the merits properly disposed of in the summary 
judgment portion.s 
The Stelling plaintiffs asserted that jurisdiction existed 
under section 30P of the Labor-Management Relations Act 
1. 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. Dec., 1978) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members 
were Kennedy and Tang, JJ.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2890 (1979). 
2. Reported as Case v. IBEW, 438 F. Supp. 856 (D. Alaska 1977). 
3. 587 F.2d at 138l. 
4. 438 F. Supp. at 859. 
5. 587 F.2d at 138l. 
6. 1d. at 1389. 
7. 438 F. Supp. at 859. 
8. 587 F.2d at 1389. 
9. Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) reads, in relevant part: 
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a 
labor organization ... or between any such labor organiza-
359 
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(LMRA) because a union constitution is enforceable as a "con-
tract between labor organizations" in district court. The plain-
tiffs alleged that various sections of the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 10 were also involved when 
the various union officers misinterpreted the union constitution. 
Although the LMRDA claim certainly merits extensive analysis, 
it will be discussed only briefly. This Note will focus on the 
Ninth Circuit's jurisdictional decision under section 301 of 
LMRA. 
The district court dismissed the section 301 claim because 
plaintiffs grounded their complaint on provisions of the union 
constitution. The district court, interpreting a previous Ninth 
Circuit opinion, II deeided that section 301's grant of federal juris-
diction for labor contract violations does not also authorize suits 
for breaches of union constitutions. The court of appeals agreed 
with the dismissal, but not the analysis. The appellate court , 
held that suit for breach of a union constitution is within the 
jurisdiction of the district court when a sufficient relationship 
between the constitution and labor-management relations 
exists. 12 The court of appeals recently applied its Stelling deci-
sion in Studio Electrical Technicians Local 728 v. International 
Photographers of the Motion Picture Industries,13 and though it 
followed the "nexus analysis," requiring a significant relation-
ship between the union constitution and labor-management rela-
tions, it appeared to also agree with a district court's statement 
that union constitutions are not contracts under section 301 and 
hence there can never be jurisdiction under that section. U 
tions, may be brought in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of 
the parties. 
The district court ruled that this section did not authorize suits for violations of a union 
constitution between labor organizations, a parent and its local. 438 F. Supp. at 858. 
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412, 415, 501 & 609 (1976). 
11. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Svacek, 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970). 
12. 587 F.2d at 1384. 
13. 598 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. June, 1979) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were 
Trask, J., and Callister, D.J.). 
14. The Studio circuit panel summarized the Stelling § 301 rule by stating: 
We addressed this question recently in Stelling v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, ... and concluded 
that, while a suit for breach of a union constitution could be 
cognizable under § 301, jurisdiction is not conferred "if [the] 
controversy is related only to a union dispute which will not 
2
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Stelling accepted the Alaska District Court's analysis of the 
LMRDA, with the modification that the indispensable party 
analysis was superfluous. 15 In reaching this outcome, the court of 
appeals adopted the district court's analysis of section 501 of the 
LMRDA,16 taking the "broad" or majority view of that section. 17 
The Ninth Circuit's view of a union official's fiduciary duty to 
members under LMRDA section 501 is not limited to monetary 
responsibilities, but extends broadly to all matters entrusted to 
affect external labor relations." ... Applying this standard, 
we held jurisdiction was lacking under § 301 when local mem-
bers alleged that the international and local unions violated 
the union's constitution by denying them the right to vote on 
the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement. 
[d. at 553 (footnote and citation omitted). 
The problem arises because of a statement earlier in the Studio opinion where the 
court seemed to note with approval that the district court had decided: "The union con-
stitution was not a contract and therefore that it lacked jurisdiction under LMRA § 
301. ... [Wje agree with the district court's conclusion " .. " [d. at 552 n.1. Based on 
the reliance on Stelling, the "district court's conclusion" with which Studio agrees is not 
that the Union Constitution was not a contract, but that it was insufficiently related to 
external labor relations to render it a contract under § 301. 
15. 587 F.2d at 1385. The district court had separated the prayers for injunction and 
declaratory relief under the LMRDA. In its analysis of the injunctive claim, it assumed 
that the plaintiffs would prevail and then noted that without the joinder of the employer 
group, whose contract was to be voided if the relief was granted, no adequate remedy 
could be crafted. Therefore, under the FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) and Lomayatawa v. Hatha-
way, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975), that part of the charge must be dismissed. 438 F. 
Supp. at 859-60. 
16. Section 501 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976) provides: 
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives 
of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to 
such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore, 
the duty of each such person, taking into account the special 
problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its 
money and property solely for the benefit of the organization 
and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the same 
in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolu-
tions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain 
from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in 
behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his 
duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal 
interest which conflicts with the interests of such organization, 
and to account to the organization for any profit received by 
him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions con-
ducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organiza-
tion. A general exculpatory provision in the constitution and 
bylaws of such. . . a governing body purporting to relieve any 
such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by 
this section shall be void as against public policy. 
17. This decision had been left undetermined in Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271, 1275 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1972). 
3
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the care of that official. I8 However, the courts evaluating claims 
of breach of those duties give great weight to the union officer's 
interpretations of those obligations, if they are reasonable and 
not arbitrary.19 In dealing with various other issues, the Stelling 
court concluded that: 1) section 101 of the LMRDN° is activated 
only during union elections and does not give union members the 
right to vote on specific issues21 2) union members must exhaust 
internal union procedures before bringing federal suit,22 and 3) 
though attorney's fees may be appropriate for successful plain-
tiffs under section 101 of the LMRDA,23 the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied those expenses to these plain-
tiffs either because it felt them inappropriate, or because the 
plaintiffs were not successful.24 
B. FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED 
In 1946, the IBEW entered into a national pension plan 
agreement with the National Electrical Contractors Association 
(NECA) for the benefit of all IBEW members.25 The NECA, a 
18. 587 F.2d at 1387. 
19. Id. at 1388, quoting with approval Vestal v. Hoffa, 451 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972). 
20. Section 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976) provides: 
Equal Rights - Every member of a labor organization shall 
have equal rights and privileges within such organization to 
nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the 
labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to 
participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business 
of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations 
in such organization's constitution and bylaws. 
21. 587 F.2d at 1385. 
22. Id. at 1390-91. The court relied on § 101(a)(4), 29 U .S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1976) 
which provides: 
Protection of the right to sue - No labor organization shall 
limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in 
any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency 
... {p1rovided, [tjhat any such member may be required to 
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a 
four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before in-
stituting legal or administrative proceedings against such orga-
nizations or any officer thereof. . . . 
23. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 466 F.2d 1267 
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1976). 
24. 587 F.2d at 1390. Plaintiffs also asserted jurisdiction under § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 
411 (1976), and under § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 609 (1976), which prohibits discipline by the 
labor organization against members who had asserted rights under LMRDA. The § 609 
claim was declared moot and dismissed. 
25. Actually, only the 374 U.S. locals of IBEW were covered by the International 
Construction Agreement (lCA). The Canadian locals were not party to the ICA. 438 F. 
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national association of employers and the IBEW International 
President (the President) renegotiated that agreement, with the 
President acting on the authority of a resolution of the 1976 
IBEW convention. In December, 1976, the President and the 
NECA entered into the International Construction Agreement 
(ICA). As a part of the ICA, NECA increased its contributions to 
the pension plan from $30,000,000 to $90,000,000.26 The President 
ordered all 374 affected locals to incorporate the ICA into their 
local agreements. All of the locals did so, except Local 1547 (the 
Local), which rejected the agreement. Upon notifying the Presi-
dent of the membership vote, the Local's Business Agent was di-
rected to incorporate the ICA into the agreement with the Alaska 
Chapter of NECA, which he did. The plaintiffs filed this action 
in March 1977, seeking an injunction to halt the intended imple-
mentation of the ICA on July 1, 1977, pending a ratification vote 
of the affected 10cals.27 
Various members of the Local, including John Stelling, 
wrote to the President requesting that his instructions to incor-
porate the ICA be rescinded on the grounds that Article IV, sec-
tion 3(13) of the union constjtution28 mandated a membership 
ratification vote before such agreement could be incorporated. 
They were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs Darby and Hix asked officers 
of the Local to sue IBEW to force the ratification vote, but they 
were also unsuccessful. Darby and Hix were both disciplined but 
continued to work for reforms. Both appealed the discipline 
Supp. at 858. 
26. Though the record doesn't indicate the bargaining posture of the President, the 
district court stated "the terms admittedly and obviously involved some concession by 
the mEW." [d. 
27. 587 F.2d at 1382. 
28. There are actually two critical sections of the mEW Constitution, Art. IV, §§ 
3(12) and 3(13). Plaintiffs alleged that § 3(13) required a ratification vote on the ICA; 
defendants asserted that § 3(13) was reached only if § 3(12) didn't apply, which they 
asserted did so. The sections state: 
3(12) The International President is empowered as follows: 
To enter into . . . agreements with any . . . associa-
tion of employers . . . to cover the entire jurisdiction 
of the mEW. 
3(13) The International President ... shall not enter into 
agreements affecting wages, hours and conditions of 
employment where local union agreement, covering 
such employment, already exists, without first notify-
ing at least thirty (30) days in advance of such agree-
ments, the local unions so concerned or affected, in a 
district, and then only by procuring consent of a major-
ity of the local unions in the district or the individual 
local unions affected by this agreement. 
587 F .2d at 13f'- nn 
5
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through intra-union procedures and in August, 1977, the IBEW 
dismissed all charges against them.29 
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Alaska District Court on March 
28, 1977, asking the court to enforce Article IV, section 3(13) of 
the IBEW Constitution; the plaintiffs specifically refused to 
attack the ICA directly30 and asserted that section 301 of the 
LMRA gave the district court jurisdiction to enforce the consti-
tution. The district court determined that under Hotel & Res-
taurant Employees v. Svacek,31 section 301 will not support a 
cause of action where a union member sues for breach of the 
union constitution, even if the constitutional rights are related to 
a collective bargaining agreement.32 The court of appeals dis-
agreed, finding that in certain instances a union constitution will 
support a section 301 suit when the issues raised have "trau-
matic industrial and economic repercussions, ... or signifi-
cantly affected labor-management relations."33 Since in Stelling, 
plaintiffs refused to attack the ICA directly, the court of appeals 
ruled that there was an insufficient nexus between the labor-
management relations and the constitutional dispute to warrant 
taking jurisdiction.34 It is significant to note, however, that plain-
tiffs got their day in court, for the merits of the LMRDA section 
501 claim were heard. The plaintiff's position, however, did not 
withstand a summary judgment motion.35 The significance of the 
fact that plaintiffs did not lack a forum under Stelling on the 
section 301 suit will be discussed below.3ft 
C. SECTION 301 OF THE LMRA 
Section 301 of the LMRA was adopted by the Taft-Hartley 
Congress of 1947 to eliminate certain technical obstacles to suits 
29. This factual pattern is distilled in 587 F.2d at 1381-82 and 438 F. Supp. at 858. 
30. As to why the plaintiffs refused to atack the lCA directly, thereby placing their 
constitutional claim in a self-imposed isolation, the record is silent. Several reasons sug-
gest themselves. Perhaps plaintifs were attempting to avoid the necessary party analysis 
(see note 15 supra), or perhaps they were attempting to have a union constitution held to 
be a "contract" under § 301 in its own right. 
31. 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970). 
32. 438 F. Supp. at 859. 
33. 587 F.2d at 1383, quoting Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 916 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). 
34. 587 F.2d at 1384. 
35. [d. at 1389. 
36. See notes and accompanying text. 
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in federal court for breach of a collective bargaining agreementY 
It states: 
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization . . . or between 
any such labor organizations, may be brought in 
any district court of the United States having ju-
risdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the 
citizenship of the parties.38 
The obstacles to federal jurisdiction that Congress attempted to 
correct arose partially from the common law requirement that 
before a union could be sued, all of the members of the union 
had to be joined in the action. Another contributing factor was 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193239 that had apparently deprived 
federal courts of jurisdiction over conflicts arising in the labor-
management area. One of the major problems with section 301 
(besides the dearth of legislative history) was that Congress 
neglected to repeal the contradictory sections of other federal la-
bor laws (for example, Norris-LaGuardia) or to explain the rela-
tive functions of each in light of these contradictions.40 
37. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Rela-
tions: ll., 59 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1959). See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agree-
ments: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1027, 1034-40 (1963), and 
Epstein, The Expanding Coverage of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 26 LAB. L.J. 439 (1975). 
38. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). 
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). 
40. A profitable comparison can be made between § 301 and the following sections of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no 
court of the United States, as herein defined, shall have juris-
diction to issue any restraining order or temporary or perma-
nent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor 
dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions of the 
Act; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or per-
manent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy de-
clared in this Act. 
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
No offic~ or member of any association or organization, and 
no association or organization participating or interested in a 
labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of 
the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, 
members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual partici-
pation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratifica-
tion of such acts after actual knowledge thereof. 
7
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The history of section 301 is replete with problems of judi-
cial interpretation, with the major interpretive difficulties arising 
from the language of the statute. For example, what items are 
included in the term "contracts"? How is the term "labor organ-
ization" to be interpreted? Who is bound by the contract, the 
parties negotiating it or the employees it was negotiated for, or 
both? Who has standing to bring a section 301 suit? Once the 
jurisdictional criteria are established, preemption and conflict of 
law problems also arise: 1) what law is to be used to interpret 
the contracts? 2) what is the effect of overlapping or contradic-
tory provisions of other labor laws?, and 3) what is the role of the 
National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) and the state courts, 
who apparently have parallel jurisdiction of many of the same 
issues?41 While the Stelling court never got past the first four 
jurisdiction questions, the preemption and conflicts areas are 
both fascinating and largely unresolved.42 They are, however, 
beyond the scope of this Note, which will focus on the juris-
dictional problem presented to the Stelling panel. 
The Stelling court dealt primarily with the jurisdictional 
questions of what constitutes a "contract" and who can sue 
whom under it, and determined that a union constitution is a 
section 301 contract when it is sufficiently related to external 
labor-management relations.43 A sufficient relationship exists 
when the controversy arising under the constitution has a clear 
nexus to labor-management relations and is not confined to in-
ternal union affairs'" In establishing the necessity of a "nexus" 
test to determine jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit created proce-
dural rules for the federal district courts of the Ninth Circuit. 
This power to establish a common law for the federal courts is 
drawn from an analysis of policy considerations implicit in the 
federal labor laws and the state court case law on internal union 
affairs. Exercise of this power will profoundly impact on which 
disputes shall be substantively analyzed in the Ninth Circuit. To 
facilitate an understanding of this impact, first the judicial his-
tory of section 301 will be discussed. Then, the influences that 
• 
29 U.S.C. § 105 (1976). For text of § 301(a), see text accompanying note 38 supra, and for 
§ 301(b), see note 49 infra. 
41. See Meltzer, supra note 37, at 270 for a slightly different formulation of the in-
terpretive difficulties of § 30l. 
42. [d. at 276-8l. 
43. 587 F.2d at 1383. 
44. [d. at 1384. 
8
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culminated in the Stelling decision will be noted. Though a 
major part of section 301 case law has dealt with judicial enforce-
ment of arbitration provisions and no-strike clauses, that body of 
law is only marginally relevant.45 
Judicial History of Section 301 
The first time the Supreme Court faced an issue arIsmg 
under the provisions of section 301, it was unable to reach a con-
sensus. In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees u. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,48 the Court reviewed an Illinois 
decision holding that section 301 would not support a suit by a 
union on behalf of its members for wages believed due the 
employees under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
Three justices47 strongly implied that section 301 was unconstitu-
tional for it gave federal courts the right to apply state law and 
therefore conflicted with the provisions of Article III of the 
United States Constitution. 48 However, by determining that the 
union had no standing to bring a suit for uniquely personal 
rights of employees, (thereby ignoring the express language of 
section 301(b)49) the three justices dismissed the claim without 
reaching the constitutional issues.5o Another three justices51 con-
45. Duhau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 432 (1969); 
Rains, Boys Market Injunctions: Strict Scrutiny of the Presumption of Arbitrability, 28 
LAB. L.J. 30 (1977); Note, Some Problems Relating to Judicial Protection of the Right to 
Have Arbitration Agreements Enforced Under Subsection 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 
59 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1959); Note, Employer Remedies for Breach of No-Strike Clauses, 
39 IND. L.J. 387 (1964). See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, Ch. 17 
(1971 & Cumm. Supp. 1971-75 & Supp. 1976, 1977, 1978). 
46. 348 U.S. 437 (1955). 
47. Id. at 439. (Frankfurther, Burton and Harlan, JJ.). 
48. Id. at 449-59. Article Ill, § 2 of the United States Constitution grants jurisdiction 
to the federal courts. See note 59 infra and accompanying text. 
49. Section 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) states: 
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an 
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Chapter and 
any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in 
this Chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such 
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in be-
half of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the 
United -States. Any money judgment against a labor organiza-
tion in a district court of the United States shall be enforce-
able only against the organization as an entity and against its 
assets, an~ shall not be enforceable against any individual 
member or his assets. 
50. 348 U.S. at 453. 
51. Id. at 461 (Warren, Clark and Reed, JJ.). 
9
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curred on the dismissal, but not on the constitutional dicta. 52 
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented, arguing that 
the union had standing to sue, and that section 301 was more 
than merely a jurisdictional grant to apply state law. Justice 
Douglas argued that Congress had intended to grant authority to 
the federal courts to develop federal rules to interpret collective 
bargaining agreements.53 
The Douglas-Black position ultimately 'prevailed, when in 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,54 Justice Douglas, writ-
ing for a majority, stated that section 301 is more than jurisdic-
tional: "[Section 301] expresses a federal policy that federal 
courts enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor 
organizations and that industrial peace can best be established 
only in that way. "55 
Lincoln Mills arose in the context of a union suit against an 
employer for specific performance of an arbitration clause in 
their collective bargaining agreement. The union had filed a 
grievance. The employer refused to submit to final and binding 
arbitration as the contract arbitration clause required. Justice 
Douglas noted that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred federal 
courts from granting equitable relief such as specific enforce-
ment, but he found the Norris-LaGuardia provisions inapplica-
ble because they were not directed toward the abuses raised in 
Lincoln Mills.58 This creative reading of the statutory language 
was apparently not palatable to Justices Burton and Harlan who 
preferred the logic of the Court's inherent equitable jurisdiction 
"nurtured by a congressional policy to encourage and enforce la-
bor arbitration in industries affecting commerce."57 Justice 
Frankfurter filed a strong dissent, questioning the authority of 
federal courts to create a body of federal common law, whether 
accomplished through an inherent equitable power of the courts 
or through legislative fiat.58 The question of where the federal 
law is to be derived from is left decidedly unclear by Lincoln 
52. [d. at 465. 
53. [d. 
54. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
55. [d. at 455. 
56. [d. at 458-59. Assuming that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed at a particu-
lar goal (see note 40 supra) by attaching stringent conditions on § 301 jurisdiction, the 
Stelling court is probably reflecting the remnants of that influence. 
57. [d. at 460 (Burton, J., concurring). 
58. [d. at 480-81 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
10
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Mills,59 and the Stelling court's decision is but the latest in a 
long series of cautious judicial footsteps in the molding of the 
new law. 
Justice Traynor, of the California Supreme Court, empha-
sized many of the unresolved areas of the Lincoln Mills decision. 
In McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of 
Carpenters, 80 he stated that the recent Lincoln Mills decision did 
not remove from the purview of state courts, all disputes that 
concern issues arguably covered by the language of section 301. 
He noted that the new "federal common law" had no substance 
as yet and questioned the impact of this amorphous area on 
state court determinations in deciding claims grounded in collec-
tive bargaining areas.81 As one commentator pointed out, Justice 
Traynor was probably unduly concerned, as this federal common 
law would probably be developed from the state courts' case law: 
[E]xcept for a narrow range of issues, neither the 
LMRA nor other national labor laws supply a 
meaningful guide for the development of a new 
body of jurisprudence to govern the enforcement 
of collective agreements. It thus seems likely that 
the new federal law will be distilled largely from 
state court doctrines, which in turn are derived 
largely from commercial law analogies reshaped to 
some extent to reflect the distinctive elements of 
the collective bargaining relationship.B2 
59. About the only question clearly resolved in Lincoln Mills, was the constitutional 
one. Justice Douglas stated that every complaint grounded in § 301 stated a federal ques· 
tion under Art. m of the Federal Constitution: 
There is no constitutional difficulty. Article m, § 2, extends 
the judicial power to cases "arising under ... the Laws of the 
United States .... " The power of Congress to regulate these 
labor· management controversies under the Commerce Clause 
is plain .... A case or controversy arising under § 301(a) is, 
therefore, one within the purview of judicial power as defined 
in Article m. 
[d. at 457 (citations omitted). See also Meltzer, supra note 37, at 274. 
60. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). Justice 
Traynor virtually predicted the outcome in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236 (1959), which established that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to [29 
U.S.C. §§ 157 or 158 (1976)] of the [LMRA], the States as well as the federal courts must 
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of 
state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S. at 245. The ramifica· 
tions of federal presumption are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally C. MORRIS, 
supra note 45, at Ch. 32. 
61. 49 Cal. 2d at 57·64, 315 P.2d at 328·33. 
62. Meltzer, supra note 37, at 278. 
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The year following Lincoln Mills was productive insofar as 
judicial construction of section 301 was concerned. Two district 
courts extended section 301's language to include a union's con-
stitution within the definition of "contract,"63 sparking some des-
perate pleas to limit 301 disputes between international unions. 64 
The Supreme Court decided that the district courts could look to 
state law to interpret collective bargaining agreements provided 
such state law was not inconsistent with the federal labor law 
policies.65 The Seventh Circuit grappled with some of the diffi-
culties of section 301 in United Textile Workers v. Textile Work-
ers Union. 66 The Textile Workers Union (TWU) filed for an elec-
tion in a unit represented by the United Textile Workers (UTW) 
and UTW complain.ed to the AFL-CIO, the parent body of both 
the international unions. Under the AFL-CIO no-raiding agree-
ments, an impartial umpire heard the issue and decided in favor 
of UTW and ordered TWU to withdraw its request with the 
NLRB for an electionY When TWU refused, UTW brought a 301 
suit to enforce the umpire's decision. Meanwhile, the NLRB or-
dered an election. A district court issued a temporary restraining 
order (TRO) against the NLRB,68 and the dispute proceeded to 
the court of appeals. The Seventh Circuit issued an interim or-
der dissolving the TRO and reviewed the dispute, de novo, refus-
ing both to be bound by the umpire's decision and to allow 
NLRB participation in the process.GD The court eventually agreed 
with the umpire and TWU withdrew its election request. The 
NLRB allowed TWU to withdraw its request, but stated that it 
did not agree with the court's presumption of jurisdiction.70 The 
Second Circuit had decided that 301 not only covered written 
"contracts" but if past practices and policies were definite 
enough, they would assume jurisdiction to enforce them under 
section 301; the court then affirmed that decision in 1961.71 
63. Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 187 F. Supp. 393 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Carpenter's Local 2608 v. Millmen's Local 1495, 169 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. 
Cal. 1958). See also Epstein, supra note 37, at 444-45. 
64. Note, Applying the "Contracts Between Labor Organizations" Clause of Taft-
Hartley Section 301: A Plea for Restraint} 69 YALE L.J. 299 (1959). 
65. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). 
66. 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958). See Epstein, supra note 37, at 440; Meltzer, supra 
note 37, at 296-97. 
67. UTW v. TWUA, 30 Lab. Arb. 244 (1958) (Cole, Arb.). 
68. UTW v. TWUA, 42 L.R.R.M. 2066 (N,D, IlL 1958). 
69, Meltzer, supra note 37, at 296-97. 
70. [d. at 297; Personal Prod. Corp., 122 N .L.R.B. 563 (1958). 
71. Hamilton Foundry & Mfg. Co, v. Moulders & Foundry Workers, 193 F.2d 209 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952) (oral collective bargaining agreement enforced 
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The Supreme Court' entered the fray again in 1962, issuing 
three major decisions, Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining CO.,72 Retail 
Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods,73 and Smith v. Evening News. 74 Atkin-
son decided that "labor organization" was to be interpreted sim-
ilarly to section 152(5)15 of the LMRA (thereby resurrecting the 
NLRB's expertise in labor relations). Lion Dry Goods upheld the 
expansive reading of "contracts" to include no-raiding agree-
ments between international unions. Evening News continued 
the expansion of 301, by specifically overruling Westinghouse 
and by holding that unions have standing to bring suit to enforce 
"uniquely personal rights" of the employees it represents.78 The 
Court's intent in overruling Westinghouse was to give a broad 
reading to section 30l. 77 
By 1962, section 301 had assumed an imposing stature in 
the interpretation of disputes in all aspects of labor-management 
relations and labor relations in general. "Contracts" included 
collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers 
and these agreements could be enforced on behalf of individual 
employees and/or their unions. 78 "Contracts" also included no-
raiding agreements between international unions. 7U The Court 
had not spoken directly on whether "contracts" extended to such 
things as union constitutions, though there were strong hints 
that as long as the decision was not inconsistent with federal 
labor policies, the federal courts could enforce provisions of union 
constitutions and charters through state law rules.80 Neverthe-
without mentioning § 301); accord, Hod Carriers Local 33 v. Mason Tenders, 291 F.2d 
496 (2d Cir. 1961). 
72. 370 U.S. 238 (1962), rev'd in part, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 
398 U.S. 235 (1970) (Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar injunctive relief for breach of no-
strike clause in collective bargaining agreements). 
73. 369 U.S. 17 (1962). 
74. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
75. The NLRB has broadly interpreted this section to include trustees of a pension 
plan, NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
974 (1968), or a group of unorganized workers protesting wages, NLRB v. Kennametal, 
Inc., 183 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950). This part of the Atkinson decision goes a long way 
towards expanding the scope of § 301. See Epstein, supra note 37, at 442; Carpenters 
Local 1219 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 493 F.2d 93 (1st Cir. 1974). 
76. 371 U.S. at 199. 
77. "Section 301 is not to be given a narrow ruling." [d. 
78. Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
79. Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, 369 U.S. 17 (1962). 
SO. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), where the 
Supreme Court affirmed a state court determination that a union constitution was a con-
tract under which wrongfully expelled members of a union could sue for reinstatement. 
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less, except in the area of arbitration,81 the Supreme Court has 
bowed out of the area covered by section 301,82 thus allowing the 
circuits to grapple, relatively unaided, with the parameters of 
the federal law fashioned to cover contracts in the labor area. 
Since Evening News, the circuits have primarily dealt with 
who may sue under section 301 and what constitutes "contracts" 
covered by that section. Both of these concerns were apparent in 
the Stelling decision and have formed a large area.in the devel-
oping federal common law of labor relations. The preemption 
areas, insofar as the problems of choice of law and forum, are 
potentially explosive.83 In interpreting conduct that arguably 
transgresses both the area of sections 301 of the LMRA, and pro-
visions administered by the NLRB, there are three forums avail-
able: the state courts, the NLRB and the district courts. The 
state courts are preempted if the dispute is arguably an unfair 
labor practice and subject to the exclusive concern of the NLRB. 
But if a collective bargaining agreement or union constitution is 
disputed, there are strong ~rguments for the state courts to' 
assert jurisdiction, if only to create principles for the federal 
common law to incorporate.84 The NLRB is likely to defer to 
any grievance provisions in the contract83 and if deference is 
accorded, the district courts are likely to become the appropriate 
forum for litigation of contract disputes. 
Proper Parties under Section 301 
The Stelling court's statement that "jurisdiction [under sec-
tion 301] depends on the nature of the action rather than the 
status of the parties"86 represents the broad consensus of the cir-
cuits87 that virtually anyone can bring suit under section 301 as 
long as the controversy involves a contract between labor organi-
zations. The days of the Westinghouse decision when "uniquely 
81. See text accompanying note 65 supra. 
82. Stelling v. Local 1547, mEW, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. 
Ct. 2890 (1979); Local 657, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Parks v. mEW, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). 
83. See text accompanying notes 40 to 41 supra. 
84. See notes 60 to 62 supra and accompanying text. 
85. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). 
86. 587 F.2d at 1383, citing Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976). 
87. [d. 
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personal rights" of employees were not enforceable by the unions 
representing those employees are long gone. In Hines v. Anchor 
Motor Freight,88 one of the few Supreme Court signposts since 
1962, this point was specifically emphasized. The trend has ex-
tended so far as to allow a suit against individual employees for 
personal breaches of a collective bargaining agreement negoti-
ated on their behalf.89 
The consensus of the circuits is also indicated by the uni-
form interpretation of "labor organization," to include sister 
locals involved in inter-union disputes. This reading of labor or-
ganizations is drawn from LMRA, section 152(5)90 as defined by 
the NLRB.91 
"Contracts" Covered by Section 301 
After deciding, in Lion Dry Goods, that "contracts" includes 
more than collective bargaining agreements,92 the Supreme 
Court established in Smith v. Evening News that "[s]ection 301 
is not to be given a narrow reading. "93 Prior to Stelling, there 
were two major lines of analyses in interpreting what "contracts" 
were subject to section 301; one line was represented by the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in Parks v. IBEW;94 the other was rep-
resented by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hotel & Restaurant 
Employees v. Svacek. 95 
The Fourth Circuit, in a well reasoned opinion, decided that 
contracts include union constitutions. After noting that the 
Supreme Court had not addressed the question, the Parks court 
looked to legislative history for guidance. They decided that, at 
best, Congress had not foreseen the question.98 The Parks court 
concluded that "[i]t is also possible, however, to conclude that 
Congress would have deemed it appropriate for federal courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over such disputes because, as the present 
88. 424 U.S. 555 (1976). See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 
(1971). 
89. New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
90. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976). 
91. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. 
92. 369 U.S. at 25-28. 
93. 371 U.S. at 199. 
94. 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). 
95. 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970). 
96. 314 F.2d at 916. 
• 
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one, they have traumatic industrial and economic repercus-
sions. ''17 In accepting jurisdiction, the Parks court did not re-
quire a showing of traumatic industrial and economic conse-
quences. Congress, they said, could have considered disputes 
arising around union constitutions to be of serious consequence 
to labor-management relations.u8 The Parks court determined 
that the preemption doctrine was inappropriate to section 301 
disputes.vI In rapid succession, the First,IOO Secondlol and Sev-
enth Circuits l02 followed the Parks court lead. 
The other major theory had been announced in the Ninth 
Circuit's Svacek decision. In that decision, the union had sued 
under section 301 to collect a fine levied against one of their 
members for crossing a picket line. In a per curiam decision, the 
Ninth Circuit dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. The 
Svacek court stated the general federal policy that internal 
union affairs were not subject to district court interference; how-
ever, they also issued a blanket statement that section 301 does 
not confer jurisdiction over internal disputes of unions. lo3 The 
TenthlO4 and the Third Circuits l05 agreed with the Ninth, and 
those courts that attempted to reconcile Parks with Svacek and 
Smith v. United Mine Workers lO8 declined to follow Svacek inso-
far as the blanket "internal union affairs" language. lol One com-
mentator attempted to reconcile the decisions and concluded: 
97. [d. (emphasis added). 
98. [d. at 915. 
99. [d. at 914. 
100. Carpenters Local 1219 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 493 F.2d 93 (1st 
Cir. 1974). 
101. Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 
1009 (1971). Though the Abrams court reluctantly accepted jurisdiction, it left open the 
question of whether a union charter, standing alone, is a § 301 contract. Accord, Santos 
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 547 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit 
resolved any questions left open by Abrams by accepting jurisdiction over a union consti. 
tution in a § 301 context. 
102. Local 657, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1256 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977). 
103. 431 F.2d at 706. 
104. Smith v. UMW, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974). But ct. Adams v. International 
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 262 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1959) (in a non-301 context, the Tenth 
Circuit stated that a union constitution was a contract). 
105. Antal v. Budzanoski, 320 F. Supp. 161 (W.O. Pa. 1970), modified sub nom., 
Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972). It is 
important to note that in this fact pattern, plaintiffs also received their day in court 
through the LMROA claims. See Epstein, supra note 37, at 450. 
106. 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974). 
107. Keck v. Employees Independent Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 241 (E.O. Pa. 1974). 
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While [Svacek and Smith v. United Mine 
Workers] seem to be directly in conflict with 
[Parks]' it may be possible to at least partially 
recondle them by taking a closer look into the na-
ture of the disputes involved and the role played 
by the judicial policy against interference in inter-
nal union affairs. lOS 
375 
In Svacek and Smith, the dispute could be characterized as 
purely internal to the workings of the unions involved and lack-
ing the traumatic industrial and economic repercussions of 
Parks. The commentator continued: 
While this distinction between purely internal dis-
putes and those intraunion disputes which have 
an effect on labor-management relations goes 
some distance toward reconciling these cases, 
there still remains a tension. This is due to the 
fact that the courts in both Svacek and Smith v. 
United Mine Workers of America make blanket 
statements to the effect that section 301 does not 
confer jurisdiction over intra-union disputes. 101 
Clearly, it was this tension that led the District Court of 
Alaska, when confronted with the Stelling fact pattern, to con-
clude that it had no jurisdiction. The Stelling appellate court 
decided that the district court would have had jurisdiction if 
the plaintiffs had alleged facts that demonstrated some nexus 
to labor-management relations, such as directly attacking the In-
ternational Construction Agreement. llo However, since the plain-
tiffs were unable to do so, the court decided that the federal 
common law of section 301 mandated that union constitutions 
could only be considered section 301 contracts if the underlying 
dispute was substantially related to labor-management relations, 
and hence the dismissal was affirmed. 111 Although the bland 
assertion that this is consistent with Svacek is farfetched,1I2 
the partial reconciliation with the Parks position is heartening 
to those seeking predictability in the area. 1I3 
108. Epstein, supra note 37, at 445. 
109. [d. at 446 (emphasis added). 
110. 587 F.2d at 1384. 
111. [d. 
112. [d. at 1383. 
113. See 1199 DC, Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. National 
Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for an earlier 
indication of the course the Stelling court is attempting to chart. 
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The Status of Section 301 Suits after Stelling 
The tension between the Parks and Smith courts is nar-
rowed by the Stelling decision. The First and Second Circuits 
seem the most receptive to accepting 301 suits over disputes 
marginally related to labor management relations,,'4 The Tenth 
and Third Circuits' positions represent the strictest stances on 
disputes that can be characterized as internal union affairs, and 
perhaps the most consistent with the policies of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. 1I5 Now, the District of Columbia Circuit and the 
Ninth Circuit are steering a middle course, accepting jurisdic-
tion,1I8 but demanding more than conclusary allegations of 
substantial labor-management relations impact.1I7 Until the 
Supreme Court clarifies the area, the federal common law of 
labor-management relations will be fashioned with a great deal 
of local variance. 
D. THE IMPACT OF THE LMRDA ON THE 301 ISSUES 
In Stelling, it is critical to note that the court, in denying 
jurisdiction under section 301 did reach the issue on the merits 
as presented under the LMRDA.lIs Plaintiffs asserted in the 301 
context that the Union Constitution mandated a ratification vote 
on the ICA, and in the LMRDA context that certain union offi-
cials had breached their fiduciary duty to the membership by 
denying that vote. Although plaintiffs were unsuccessful in 
pressing their claims, the court, through the process of expansive 
reading of section 501 of the LMRDA, was able to relegate sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA to areas not involving intra-union 
matters. III 
The Scope of Section 501 of the LMRDA 
Other circuits have split on the issue of whether a union 
officer's fiduciary obligations under section 501 of the LMRDA 
114. See Local Union 1219, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners, 493 F.2d 93 (1st Cir. 1974); New York State United Teachers v. 
Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). 
115. See cases cited at notes 104 and 105 supra. 
116. While neither circuit has actually accepted jurisdiction yet, they threaten to do 
so. See cases cited at notes 95 and 113 supra and accompanying text. 
·117. 587 F.2d at 1384. 
118. "The allegation that appellees have denied the membership of the union the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to vote is a sufficient assertion of a breach of trust on 
the part of the appelleesitllYoke the jurisdiction of § 501." [d. at 1387. 
119. See Epstein, supra note 37, at 449-50. 
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encompasses more than monetary obligations. The district court 
in Stelling, after analyzing the majority120 and minority121 posi-
tions, noted that the Ninth Circuit had expressly left the ques-
tion open. 122 The lower court then opted for the majority view 
that a union official's fiduciary duty to members should be 
broadly construed and the Ninth Circuit approved. The Second 
Circuit remains the only adherent of the minority view that 
fiduciary duty is to be confined to monetary matters.123 The nar-
row, or minority view of section 501 is basically indefensible, in-
sofar as it derives from legislative history. 
This narrow view of the fiduciary obligations of union offi-
cials imposed by section 501 was first espoused in Gurton v. 
Arons. 124 The Gurton court was called upon to interpret a union's 
constitution and bylaws to assess the depth of the obligations 
imposed on the officers of the union. To aid in the interpretation, 
the court looked to the union's own interpretation of the consti-
tution. Finding that interpretation not unreasonable or arbi-
trary, the court found no breach of the fiduciary obligation. The 
Classic rationale of the LMRDA then appeared in the opinion: 
120. The Eighth Circuit first announced the majority position in Johnson v. Nelson, 
325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). Accord, Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l 
Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1973); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Cefalo v. Moffet, 449 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McCabe v. 
Local 1377, mEW, 415 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1969); Parks v. mEW, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 
1962), aff'd, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). 
121. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1971). Accord, Head v. Brotherhood of 
Ry. Clerks, 512 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1975); Vanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874 (1967). 
122. Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1972). Kerr states that the question had 
been left undecided, but see Comment, Fiduciary Duties of Union Officers Under Section 
501 of the LMRDA, 37 LA. L. REV. 875 (1977) for a strong argument that the Kerr court 
had, by the circuitous route of attaching monetary obligations to every duty of union 
officials, already adopted the majority position. 
123. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1971). 
124. [d. In Gurton, the Second Circuit stated: 
It is clear ... that Section 501 of the L.M.R.D.A. has no ap-
plication to the present controversy. A simple reading of the 
section shows that it applies to fiduciary responsibility with 
respect to the money and property of the union and that it is 
not a catch-all provision under which union officials can be 
sued on any ground of misconduct with which the plaintiffs 
. choose to charge them. If further corroboration for this position 
be needed it will be found in the legislative history and in the 
law review articles cited by Judge Tenney in his opinion in the 
district court. 
[d. at 375 (footnote omitted). 
19
Robinson et al.: Labor Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
378 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:359 
The provisions of the L.M.R.D.A. were not in-
tended by Congress to constitute an invitation to 
the courts to intervene at will in the internal af-
fairs of unions. Courts have no special expertise in 
the operation of unions which would justify a 
broad power to interfere. The internal operations 
of unions are to be left to the officials chosen by 
the members to manage those operations except 
in the very limited instances expressly provided 
by the Act. The conviction of some judges that 
they are better able to administer a union's affairs 
than the elected officials is wholly without foun-
dation. Most unions are honestly and efficiently 
administered and are much more likely to con-
tinue to be so if they are free from officious inter-
meddling by the courts. General supervision of 
unions by the courts would not contribute to the 
betterment of the unions or their members or to 
the cause of labor-management relations. 125 
The Stelling court's fiduciary analysis of the underlying dis-
pute may be subject to some criticism, because it adopts a per se 
approach: if the union's interpretation is reasonable, then there 
is no breach. 128 A more defensible position would examine the 
underlying dispute. l27 While criticism is well grounded in theory, 
125. 1d. However, the Gurton court went on to base its reading of § 501 on legislative 
history.Id. at 376. See Kratzke, Fidiciary Obligations in the Internal Political Affairs of 
Labor Unions Under Section 501(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1019 (1977). Professor Kratzke pointed out that the 
Gurton court arrived at their legislative history analysis by relying on Judge Tenney's 
analysis below: 
Judge Tenney's reading of the legislative history is open to 
some criticism. In Judge Tenney's discussion of the legislative 
history of section 501(a), he comments that: 
The legislative history of the Section would appear to 
also be in accord with defendants' position that the Sec-
tion relates solely to questions of financial dealings. 
Thus, during the course of debate, Senators McClellan 
and Ervin made it quite clear that the Section would 
relate solely to matters of money and property. See II 
Leg. History 1129-31 (1959). 
Unfortunately, the debate to which Judge Tenney refers con-
cerned the Senate version of the bill . . . which was never 
passed. 
1d. at 1026 n.37 (citations omitted). See also Comment, supra note 122, at 875; Beaird, 
Union Trusteeship Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 
1959, 2 GA. L. REV. 469, 518 (1968). 
126. 587 F.2d at 1388-89 .• 
127. According to Professor Kratzke, the proper fiduciary analysis in Stelling would 
be to examine the union officers constitutional basis for his or her actions, and then, if 
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had the Stelling court adopted a standard fiduciary analysis, the 
probable outcome would have been identical,l28 and the actual 
approach, deferring to the unions' own interpretation, recognizes 
the political autonomy of the labor organization. 129 
Title I of the LMRDA 
The plaintiffs in Stelling asserted that defendants violated 
section 101(a)(I)130 when they denied the membership a ratifica-
tion vote. Jurisdiction is granted district courts over section 101 
disputes by section 102.131 The court held that, "although the 
LMRDA guarantees members the right to vote in union elec-
tions, it does not guarantee them the right to vote on a particu-
lar question. "132 
The Stelling decision, relying on Calhoon v. Harvey,l33 and 
that is weak, to look to the underlying dispute to discover what would be in the best 
interest of the union members as a whole. 
When a court does choose to intervene in the affairs of a labor 
organization, it must be prepared to make a determination of 
the interests of the union as a group, since without such a de-
termination the court is unable to examine the nature of the 
fiduciary obligation of union officials under section 501(a). 
Moreover, if the fiduciary obligation is defined in this manner, 
it becomes at least conceivable that the best interests of the 
labor organization and its members might not be those ex-
pressed in a vote taken at any particular meeting. Hence the 
conclusion is compelling that even an apparent infringement 
on the voting rights of union members should not be conclu-
sive proof that fiduciary obligations to the labor organization 
guaranteed under section 501(a) have been breached. 
Yet even in circuits adopting the broad view of fiduciary re-
sponsibilities under section 501(a), the courts have exhibited a 
propensity toward per se analysis. Such per se analysis is not 
suitable when the interest of the labor organization is properly 
considered. 
Kratzke, supra note 125, at 1032 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Applying this 
formula, the district court noted the Stelling fact pattern was subject to a weak constitu-
tional justification. 438 F. Supp. at 861-62. Therefore, according to Professor Kratzke, the 
lower court should have examined the underlying dispute. Nevertheless, even had it done 
80, with 373 out of 374 affected locals approving the pact, it would have been difficult if 
not impossible for the Stelling plaintiffs to show that a ratification vote would be in their 
best interest. 
128. 1d. 
129. 587 F.2d at 1389. 
130. For the text of § 101(a)(1), see note 20 supra. 
131. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976); 587 F.2d at 1385. 
132. 1d. 
133. 379 U.S. 134 (1964). 
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its progeny,134 reiterates the well-settled rule that section 
lO1(a)(l) is not violated unless plaintiffs were treated dispa-
rately. Here the plaintiffs could allege no discrimination because 
all IBEW locals had been denied the ratification vote by the 
President's interpretation of the union's constitution. Thus, the 
members' only forum is the IBEW internal procedures of 
appeal. 135 
Plaintiffs also alleged that the various union officers failed to 
inform the membership of the provisions of Title I of the 
LMRDA, the bill of rights for union members.136 However, sec-
tion 101(a)(4) suggested an exhaustion of remedies requirement 
which the Stelling court adopted. 137 Since plaintiffs had never ex-
hausted any internal union remedies, but merely filed suit, the 
court dismissed the complaint. 138 
The district court also denied attorneys' fees for plaintiffs. 
The exact theory for upholding the denial was not clear, how-
ever. The district court, citing Hall u. Cole,139 stated that there 
was no evidence to support such an award. 140 In Hall, the 
Supreme Court ruled that when a plaintiff prevails under section 
102, a court may award attorney's fees. 141 The Ninth Circuit 
stated that the lower court considered attorney's fees, and de-
nied them. What appears to have happened is that the district 
court considered that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties in the 
sense of Hall u. Cole. When the Ninth Circuit affirmed, it chose 
to view the district court's action as within that court's discre-
tion and not an application of case law.142 
E. CONCLUSION 
In Stelling, the Ninth Circuit announced that internal union 
affairs are subject to judicial supervision through section 301 of 
134. Lux v. Blackmun, 546 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1976); Fritsch v. District Council No. 
9, 493 F.2d 1061, 1063 (2d Cir. 1974; Smith v. UMW, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974). 
135. For a summary of the IBEW internal structure, see Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 
886, 916 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). 
136. Section 105 of the LMRDA provides: "Every labor organization shall inform its 
members concerning the provisions of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 415 (1976). 
137. See note 22 supra. 
138. 587 F.2d at 1391. 
139. 412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
140. "As to the issue of attorney's fees there has been no evidence to support such an 
award under the rationale of Hall u. Cole . ... " 438 F. Supp. at 862 (citation omitted). 
141. 412 U.S. at 9. 
142. 587 F.2d at 1390, distinguishing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 466 F.2d 
1267 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973). 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/13
1980] LABOR LAW 381 
the LMRA only when the underlying dispute is sufficiently re-
lated to labor-management relations. u3 Conclusory allegations 
of a nexus to labor-management relations will not be sufficient to 
state a cause of action; facts calling into question some agree-
ment between labor and management will have to be alleged. 
The source of the procedural and substantive rule is the federal 
common law crafted by the Ninth Circuit under the rule of Lin-
coln Mills and the policies of various federal labor laws. 
The Stelling court also adopted a broad interpretation of 
section 501 of the LMRDA, holding that a union officer's fiduci-
ary.duty to union members extends beyond monetary matters, to 
a spectrum of duties and responsibilities placed in the care of 
that officer. However, in interpreting the scope of those duties to 
determine if a breach has occurred, the Ninth Circuit will look to 
the union hierarchy's interpretation of the scope of their duties. 
If their interpretation is reasonable and not arbitrary, then the 
court will defer to it. 
By this juxtaposition of the LMRA and LMRDA in Stelling, 
the theory of judicial interference in internal union affaris in the 
Ninth Circuit is elucidated. If the plaintiffs object to internal de-
cisions by their officers and union and they are prepared to chal-
lenge the agreement reached with management through those in-
ternal procedures, the Ninth Circuit will accept jurisdiction 
under either the agreement or the union constitution. If plaintiffs 
143. By tying § 301 to a sufficient nexus between the beneficiaries of the Stelling 
pension fund, the employees and the signatories of the agreement (the unions and em-
ployers), the Ninth Circuit may be forestalling judicial intervention into internal union 
affairs but the delay should only be considered temporary. The applications of the Stel-
ling decision in non-pension fund situations, such as in Studio Electrical Technicians 
Local 728 v. International Photographers of the Motion Pictures Industries, 598 F.2d 557 
(9th Cir. 1979), relegates locals to their own internal proceedings of appeal. Individual 
employees attacking the use of pension fund dollars for political purposes are going to 
assert rights that need a forum. The close ties of § 301 to § 501 of LMRDA, as repre-
sented in Stelling, is perhaps a harbinger of things to come, confining employees to 
LMRDA rather than LMRA in assessing pension fund obligations. See Raskin, Pension 
Funds Could Be The Union's Secret Weapon, Fortune, Dec. 31, 1979, at 17. Mr. Raskin 
prophetizes that unions will take over investment of their huge pension funds from con-
servative investment committees and invest only in labor sympathetic businesses. Since 
pension fund committees are "labor organizations," NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381 
F.2d 61 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 974 (1968), and this step would relate these 
agreements to labor-management relations, a strong argument is available to union mem-
bers wishing to question this proposed practice under § 301 of LMRA. 
23
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are primarily concerned about the internal machinations that led 
to the agreement, they are relegated to internal appeal and 
claims under the LMRDA. 
Kevin G. Robinson 
III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AGAINST TRUSTEE-
SHIPS: BENDA V. GRAND LODGE OF INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND 
AEROSPACE WORKERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Benda v. Grand Lodge of the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Benda),1 the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction2 en-
joining a trusteeship imposed by an international union on its 
local union under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act (LMRDA or the Act).3 Benda joins a long line of cases 
1. 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. Aug., 1978) (per Sneed, J., the other panel members were 
Trask, J. and Skopil, D.J.), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 2065 (1979). 
2. 442 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (per Schwartzer, D.J.). 
3. Landrum Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461·466 (1976). For general background and 
discussion of the trusteeship provisions of the LMRDA, see Beaird, Union Trusteeship 
Provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 2 GA. L. REv. 
469 (1968); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 
58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 845·51 (1960); Note, The Trusteeship Provisions of the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act: A Review of Judicial Developments, 42 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 77 (1973); Note, Landrum Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71 YALE L. 
J. 1460 (1~62); 
Section 462 of the Act provides several proper purposes for trusteeships: 
Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor 
organization over a subordinate body only in accordance with 
the constitution and bylaws of the organization which has as· 
sumed trusteeship over the subordinate body and for the purose 
of correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the 
performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties 
of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic proce· 
dures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such 
labor organization. 
29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). 
Section 464 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Upon the written complaint of any member or subordinate 
body of a labor organization alleging that such organization has 
violated the provisions of this subchapter . . . the Secretary 
shall investigate the complaint and if the Secretary finds prob· 
able cause to believe that such violation has occurred and has 
not been remedied he shall, without disclosing the identity of 
24
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that have addressed the issue of whether a trusteeship has been 
imposed for a proper purpose under the Act} What sets Benda 
apart from these cases is the standard of review used by the Ninth 
Circuit and the manner in which the court applied its standard. 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court grant of injunctive 
relief, asserting that the key element to be considered in granting 
such relief is the relative hardship to the parties. The Benda court 
utilized a balancing test which provides that as the balance of 
harm tips toward the moving party, that party's burden of show-
ing likely success on the merits lessens.5 While the result in Benda 
is arguably justifiable, the court failed to clearly explicate its 
rationale and paid little, if any, attention to the statutory pre-
sumption of validity accorded trusteeships by the LMRDA.8 
The importance of the issue of trusteeships is illustrated by 
the statutory framework created by Congress. In 1959, Congress 
enacted the LMRDA for the purpose of regulating internal union 
affairs in order to promote union democracy. 7 To achieve this 
the complainant, bring a civil action in any district court of the 
United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization for 
such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any 
member or subordinate body of a labor organization affected by 
any violation. . . may bring a civil action in any district court 
of the United States having jurisdiction of the labor organiza-
tion for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropri-
ate. 
(c) In any proceeding pursuant to this section a trusteeship 
established by a labor organization in conformity with the pro-
cedural requirements of its constitution and bylaws and au-
thorized or ratified after a fair hearing either before the execu-
tive board or before such other body as may be provided in 
accordance with its constitution or bylaws shall be presumed 
valid for a period of eighteen months from the date of its estab-
lishment and shall not be subject to attack during such period 
except upon clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was 
not established or maintained in good faith for a purpose allow-
able under section 462 of this title. 
29 U.S.C. § 464 (1976) (emphasis added). 
4. Proper purposes are set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 462 (l976); for the relevant language 
of § 462, see note 3 supra. For case law interpreting the section see, e.g., Gordon v. 
Laborers In1'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (lOth Cir. 1973); Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United 
Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1973); National Ass'n of Letter 
Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971); McVicker v. International 
Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
5. 584 F.2d at 314-15. 
6. The provision for a statutory presumption of validity is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 
464(c) (1976). For text of the statute, see note 3 supra. 
7. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
6 (1976). 
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purpose, the Act provides for various civil and criminal enforce-
ment proceedings and for systematic disclosure via reporting.s 
The Act further regulates the imposition of trusteeships by parent 
labor organizations over their subordinate local unions.s Trustee-
ship is defined in the Act as any method of control whereby a 
labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to 
a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws. lo Acknowl-
edging that trusteeships are among the most effective devices 
which responsible international officers have to ensure order 
within their organizations,1I Congress provided that properly 
imposed trusteeships are entitled to a presumption of validity. 12 
In Benda, the Ninth Circuit held that: 1) federal courts have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute notwithstand-
ing the fact that unfair labor practice charges are pending before 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); 2) District Lodge 
508, represented by plaintiff Benda, was entitled to injunctive 
relief because the balance of hardships tipped decidedly in its 
favor, and it had some chance of success on the merits; and 3) 
the district court had abused its discretion by awarding the dis-
trict lodge attorney's fees. 13 
B. FACTS OF THE CASE 
Benda was President of District Lodge 508,14 which repre-
sented employees of Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation 
(LMSC), one of several wholly owned subsidiaries of Lockheed 
Aircraft. Prior to this dispute, the Grand Lodge of the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Inter-
national) had coordinated bargaining between district lodges and 
four regional subsidiaries of Lockheed Aircraft, but employees in 
each region had voted separately on whether to accept or reject a 
contract. In 1977, employees at three plants l5 rejected contract 
8. Id. 
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1976). 
10. 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1976). 
11. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 2424, 2437. 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1976). 
13. 584 F.2d at 319. 
14. District Lodge 508 was composed of smaller local unions from two California 
counties. It acted as the collective bargaining agent for LMSC employees. Id. at 311. 
15. The four regional subsidiaries were LMSC, Lockheed General Company 
(GELAC), Lockheed California Company (CALAC), and Lockheed Air Services Company 
(LAS). The three plants which rejected the contract were LMSC, GELAC, and CALAC. 
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proposals and went on strike. The International then informed 
the district lodges that it intended to engage in corporate-wide 
joint unified bargaining,18 thereby requiring a majority vote of all 
employees to accept a contract.17 
When the management of three of the subsidiaries made 
their final offer, two of the regional district lodgesl8 decided not 
to present the contract to the membership for a vote. The Interna-
tional ruled that this response was tantamount to a rejection of 
the offer for all subsidiaries. LMSC union representatives never-
theless voted to present the offer to their membership. Upon 
learning that LMSC employees would vote on the contract de-
spite the International's decision, the International President 
wired Benda, advising him that it had been determined that an 
emergency existed and, that the district lodge representatives 
were suspended immediately for "endangering the good and wel-
fare of the Grand Lodge, its local lodges and district lodges as well 
as the good and welfare of the organization and the member-
ship."IS The International, in conformity with its constitution and 
bylaws, thereby placed District Lodge 508 in trusteeship.20 How-
ever, before the International's representatives arrived to take 
oveJ; the district lodge, LMSC employees met and voted to accept 
their employer's final contract offer and return to work. Still, the 
International attempted to continue the strike against LMSC in 
order to force Lockheed to continue corporate-wide bargaining.21 
After taking over operation of the district lodge, the International 
distributed strike funds and later filed unfair labor practice 
charges against Lockheed for refusal to bargain.22 
16. 584 F.2d at 311. Authority for the International's action was derived from Interna-
tional Circular No. 596, published in 1958, which permitted the International President 
or an authorized committee to determine whether all bargaining units affected by multi-
unit agreements with the same employer, company or corporation should be combined for 
voting purposes or vote separately or in combination. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. GELAC and CALAC. 
19. 442 F. Supp. at 435. 
20. The International did not label its action as the imposition of a trusteeship. 584 
F.2d at 312 n.1. However, as the court points out, the Act broadly defines trusteeship to 
include "[alny receivership, trusteeship, or other method of supervision or control 
whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate 
body under its constitution or bylaws." 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1976). 
21. Employees were thus faced with a dilemma: they could return to work and risk 
union discipline or they could honor the picket line and risk dismissal by their employer. 
Though the Ninth Circuit makes much of this dilemma, 584 F.2d at 312, it is precisely 
the situation faced by many striking workers. 
22. The International charged that LMSC violated § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor 
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Three weeks after the trusteeship was imposed, the district 
court issued a preliminary injunction against it. Thus, by court 
order, the International was effectively precluded from continu-
ing its bargaining efforts on behalf of LMSC employees. In addi-
tion, the injunction signaled an end to corporate-wide bargaining, 
and the International was forced to negotiate separate agree-
ments with each of the Lockheed subsidiaries. For all practical 
purposes, the underlying dispute between the International and 
the district lodge ended once the trusteeship was preliminarily 
enjoined. 23 The International could only appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit to assert its legal right to impose a future trusteeship on a 
district lodge under similar circumstances. 
C. THE LEGAL ISSUES: PREEMPTION, ATTORNEY'S FEES, INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF 
Two of the issues dealt with by the Ninth Circuit, jurisdic-
tion and attorney's fees, were relatively unimportant. Benda adds 
little to current law on these issues. The affirmance of injunctive 
relief, on the other hand, raises serious legal questions that were 
largely left unanswered by the Benda court. These questions in-
clude when and under what circumstances a trusteeship may be 
imposed, and, once a trusteeship is imposed, what legal and fac-
tual showing must be made to enjoin it. 
The first minor issue addressed by the Benda court was 
whether federal courts were precluded from deciding disputes 
under the LMRDA when the underlying issues were pending be-
fore the NLRB as part of an unfair labor practice charge.24 The 
preemption doctrine requires that courts defer to NLRB jurisdic-
tion where the activity which is the subject of the court action is 
either "arguably protected" by the National Labor Relations Act 
or "arguably prohibited" by it.25 The International, relying on 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1976), by refusing to bargain in good faith. The 
NLRB issued a complaint based on this unfair labor practice charge, but took no further 
action pending appeal. Since this litigation has effectively resolved the underlying dispute 
it appears that the International is no longer pursuing this action. 
23. No request for a permanent injunction has been filed. Benda v. Grand Lodge of 
Int'I Ass'n, Etc., No. C-77-2761-WWS (N.D. Cal. 1977) (on file at the offices of Golden 
Gate University Law Review). 
24. For a general discussion of the preemptio!l doctrine, see R. GORMAN, supra note 
7, at 766-86; Cox, Labor Law Pre-emption RelJisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Les-
nick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. 
REv. 469 (1972); Note, Preemption: A Judicial Headache, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 358 (1976). 
25. R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 766. 
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San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon,26 argued that because they 
had filed unfair labor practice charges, only the NLRB had juris-
diction over the trusteeship dispute. The court found this argu-
ment un persuasive because the LMRDA specifically provides 
that any member of a labor organization placed in trusteeship 
may bring an action for appropriate relief in federal district 
court.27 The Ninth Circuit noted that the clear statutory language 
was controlling and thus joined the Fifth Circuit28 in holding that 
the preemption doctrine was not applicable to actions brought 
pursuant to the LMRDA.29 
The second minor issue presented in Benda was whether the 
district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to 
the district lodge. The court first noted that the grant of prelimi-
nary injunctive relief was not a decision on the merits. 30 Thus, in 
a strict sense, the district lodge was not a prevailing party. 31 Ac-
cordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the district lodge was not 
entitled to attorney's fees at this stage of the litigation and re-
versed the district court.32 
The major legal issue in Benda, and the sole topic of the 
remainder of this note, is the propriety of granting preliminary 
injunctive relief to District Lodge 508. Two questions arise: 
whether the standard of review used by the court was appropriate 
in view of the factual setting of Benda and whether the court's 
application of this standard rendered a just result consistent with 
the provisions of the LMRDA. In order to place these issues in 
26. 353 U.S. 26 (1957). 
27. 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1976). 
28. MacDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1976). 
29. 584 F.2d at 314. Apparently, the NLRB agreed for they declined to intervene in 
the International's appeal of the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. [d. at 
312. 
30. [d. at 318. 
31. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Signifi-
cantly, the Ninth Circuit noted that attorney's fees would be appropriate if "the grant of 
a preliminary injunction was the primary relief sought and effectively terminated the 
action." 584 F.2d at 318. In making such a determination the Ninth Circuit indicated that 
a federal court should look to the "practical results" of the grant of relief sought. Yablonski 
v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, the Benda court then 
sidestepped this very issue; they did not analyze the practical results of their decision, 
but merely noted that the International was "actively pursuing this litigation ... " 584 
F.2d at 319. Indeed, at no point in their opinion did the Ninth Circuit discuss the effect 
of the grant of the preliminary injunction on the International's efforts to conduct 
corporate-wide bargaining. 
32. 584 F.2d at 318. 
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context, this note begins with the statutory background of the 
LMRDA and proceeds to analyze the court's reasoning regarding 
the appropriate standard of review and its application. 
D. DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE 
The LMRDA: Statutory Background 
The LMRDA was enacted in 1959 following two years of con-
gressional investigation of abuses in internal union manage-
ment.33 The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor Management Field, headed by Senator John McClel-
lan, brought to light a wide variety of instances in which labor 
officials had misused union funds, undermined democratic proce-
dures, imposed improper trusteeships, and entered into collusive 
agreements with employers.34 The LMRDA implemented the rec-
ommendations of the McClellan Committee by: 1) establishing a 
"bill of rights" for union members; 2) requiring periodic reports 
from unions and their officers; 3) regulating union election proce-
dures; 4) regulating misappropriation of union funds; 5) prohibit-
ing communists and persons convicted of certain crimes from 
holding union office; and 6) regulating trusteeships over local 
unions.35 The Act sets forth specific guidelines for the imposition 
of trusteeships, requires reports on trusteeships, and provides a 
mechanism for local unions or their members to attack a trustee-
ship.38 
Section 462 of the Act provides that trusteeships must be 
imposed in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the 
international organization and further sets forth the permissible 
purposes for establishing a trusteeship,31 Those purposes are 
"correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the per-
formance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a 
bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or 
otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor organi-
zation."38 Section 464 provides that if a trusteeship is established 
in conformity with procedures set forth in the organization's con-
33. R. SLOVENKO, SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR· MANAGEMENT REpORTING AND DISCLOSURE 
ACT OF 1959, at 443·47 (1961). 
34. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAw 47 (1974). 
35. [d. at 48. 
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461·466 (1976). 
37. For pertinent text of § 462, see note 3 supra. 
38. [d. 
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stitution and bylaws, it is entitled to a presumption of validity 
for eighteen months and is not subject to attack except upon clear 
and convincing proof. 3D This statutory presumption of validity, 
when viewed in light of the open-ended nature of the proper pur-
pose of "otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such 
labor organization," indicates that Congress, in attempting to 
draw a line between the rights and duties of a local union and 
those of the international labor organization, intended to defer 
somewhat to the judgment and integrity of the superior organiza-
tion. 40 Finally, section 464 provides that any union member or 
subordinate body may challenge a trusteeship by filing a written 
complaint with the Secretary of Labor or by seeking relief in 
federal district court.41 Federal courts may, under their general 
equitable powers, grant injunctive relief to enjoin a trusteeship.42 
Injunctive Relief in the Trusteeship Context 
Federal courts have granted injunctive relief in two contexts. 
First, injunctions have been issued to prevent43 or terminate44 
trusteeships. Second, relief has been granted to enforce the legal 
right of an international to impose a trusteeship on a subordinate 
body.45 
The grant of a preliminary injunction is usually seen as tem-
porary, not final, relief,48 Quite often there is another step to the 
litigation process: the aggrieved party will seek a permanent in-
junction. Thus, some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, state 
that the grant or denial of injunctive relief is not a decision on 
the merits,41 The Benda court took such a position, repeatedly 
39. For pertinent text of § 464, see note 3 supra. 
40. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 2318, 2334. 
41. 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (l976): for pertinent text, see note 3 supra. 
42.1d. 
43. Daye v. Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, 234 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1964). 
44. Schonfeld v. Raftery, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1967); United Bhd. of Carpenters and 
Joiners v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872 (lOth Cir. 1965). 
45. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
46. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 814 (1929); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. 
Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1963). 
47. Courts have recognized the necessity of addressing the merits. See, e.g., Gordon 
v. Laborers Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1974); Bailey v. Dixon, 451 F.2d 160 (5th 
Cir. 1971); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Atlanta Fed. and City Servo Employees Local Union 554, v. Service Employees 
Int'I Union AFL-CIO, 441 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971); Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960 (5th 
31
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stating that its decision was not on the merits and that the litiga-
tion was continuing even though no permanent injunction was 
ever sought.48 
The Standard of Review 
Tradi tionally, the standard of review for injunctive relief has 
consisted of a four-part test,4U The four factors to be considered 
are: 1) the likelihood of success on the merits; 2) the likelihood 
of irreparable harm; 3) how injunctive relief will affect the rights 
of the parties involved; and 4) whether granting or denying the 
injunction would be in the public interest.5o Such a test requires 
that a court engage in a searching analysis of the underlying 
dispute and its ramifications; hence, under this traditional test, 
injunctive relief is not easily obtained.51 Recently, however, some 
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have significantly relaxed the 
standard of review. 52 This newer standard focuses on balancing 
the hardships to the parties resulting from a grant or denial of 
relief. 53 "One moving for a preliminary injunction assumes the 
Cir. 1970); Schonfeld v. Raftery, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1967). There is one situation in 
which a court may justifiably decline to reach the merits. When a court refuses to grant 
preliminary injunctive relief enjoining a trusteeship and the local union will have another 
opportunity to litigate on a motion for a permanent injunction, a court may correctly 
decline to delve into the merits of the case. E.g., International Bhd. of Electrical Workers 
Local 1186 v. Eli, 307 F. Supp. 495 (D. Hawaii 1969). In Eli, the International's decision 
to establish a trusteeship and assume the legal defense of the local union in a twenty 
million do\1ar suit was 
obviously a "legitimate object". While the case law dealing 
with permissible purposes under § 302 [now § 462] does not 
specifica\1y answer the question presented in this case, the ulti-
mate answer must depend on factual considerations developed 
at the hearing on a permanent injunction. Meanwhile, this 
court declines to substitute its judgment over International's 
own officers as to whether this particular objective of Interna-
tional was "legitimate". 
[d. at 506-07. But Benda is clearly dissimilar. Once the district court enjoined the trustee-
ship there were no further hearings. 
48. 584 F.2d at 318; see note 23 supra. 
49. 7 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 65.04, at §§ 66-39 to 69-46 (2d ed. 1976); accord, 
Virginia Petro. Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921,925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). For a discussion 
of the various standards, see Mulligan, Preliminary Injunctions in the Second Circuit, 43 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 831, 836 (1977). 
50. Mu\1igan, supra note 49. 
51. Wing v. Arnall, 198 F.2d 571, 674-76 (Emer. Ct. App. 1952). 
52. The Second and the Ninth Circuits are the most consistent in applying a relaxed 
standard of review. See, e.g., Richter v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 669 
F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1977); Motor Vessels Theresa Ann v. Kreps, 548 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 
1977); Charlies Girls v. Revlon, 483 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1973); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. 
We\1ington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973). 
53. Mulligan, supra note 49, at 831. 
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burden of demonstrating either a combination of probable suc-
cess and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious ques-
tions are raised and the balance of hardships tips strongly in his 
favor. . . "54 Under the lenient test, injunctions are more readily 
available. 
The Benda court chose the modern, more lenient standard 
set forth in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental 
Baking CO.5S The court noted that as the balance of hardships 
tipped more decidedly toward one party, that party's need for 
demonstrating probable success or the existence of serious ques-
tions lessened. 58 Thus, the court asserted that there were not two 
separate tests of hardship and probable success, but rather a 
"single continuum."s7 Finally, the court noted some "irreducible 
minimum" must be shown: either a "fair chance of success on the 
merits" or "questions ... serious enough to require litigation."58 
There are two major differences between the traditional and 
modern standards of review. First, the newer standard strongly 
emphasizes the hardships to the parties, a relatively subjective 
factor. The likelihood of success, a factor more prone to objective 
legal analysis, is deemphasized. Second, the newer standard 
eliminates both the public policy concerns and inquiry into how 
granting relief will effect the respective rights of the parties. 
In certain circumstances, like Benda, the newer standard of 
review, making injunctive relief more available, is not appropri-
ate because the grant of injunctive relief effectively terminates 
the litigation.s9 In considering injunctive relief, courts should be 
careful to create or preserve the status quo so that a court will be 
able, upon conclusion of a fair trial, to render a meaningful deci-
sion for either party. 80 When, as in Benda, the preliminary injunc-
54. Wm. Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86,88 
(9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). 
55.Id. 
56. 584 F.2d at 315. However, on the issue of hardships, it seems that a showing of 




59. Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 546 
(1978). 
SO. Chappell v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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tion will dispose of the case, the more searching traditional analy-
sis should be employed.Bt 
In Benda, the court simply did not consider whether its deci-
sion would dispose of the case. Instead, the Ninth Circuit repeat-
edly stated that its decision was not on the merits and that the 
litigation was continuing.82 In reality, however, the preliminary 
injunction effectively ended the underlying dispute-once the 
trusteeship was enjoined, the International was precluded from 
bargaining on behalf of LMSC employees and had lost the battle 
to engage in corporate-wide bargaining with Lockheed. Thus, the 
Benda court's insistence that its decision was not on the merits 
is baffling. 
Conflict with the LMRDA 
Section 464(c) of the Act provides that a trusteeship estab-
lished in conformity with an international's constitution and by-
laws and ratified after a fair hearing shall be presumed valid for 
eighteen months subject to attack only upon clear and convincing 
proof.B3 In Benda, the court noted that the trusteeship had been 
properly established. It also noted the existence of the presump-
tion and concluded that "the presumption of validity applies 
here."84 However, the court then proceeded in its analysis as if the 
presumption was inoperative when the merits of the case were not 
before the court. Had the court applied the more stringent test, 
the presumption could have been accorded its proper weight. 
The standard of review utilized by the Benda court conflicts 
with the presumption of validity. While the standard of review 
simply calls for balancing the hardships and a showing of some 
chance of success on the merits, the Act itself provides a pre-
sumption of validity rebuttable only upon clear and convincing 
61. Only one other trusteeship case has been decided using the modern standard of 
review. San Filippo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 525 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1975). 
However, San Filippo is distinguishable from Benda. In San Filippo, the district court, 
using the traditional four-part standard of review, denied a local union injunctive relief 
because it had failed to show irreparable injury. The Second Circuit, noting that the 
standard of review placed too heavy a burden on the local union, nonetheless affirmed 
because a showing of irreparable injury was a core requirement of injunctive relief. Thus, 
neither the district court nor the Second Circuit felt compelled to discuss the question of 
the likelihood of success on the merits. 
62. 584 F.2d at 318. 
63. 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1976); for text of § 464(c), see note 3 supra. 
64. 584 F.2d at 316 n.4. 
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proof.85 This conflict or anomaly is brought into sharp focus by 
the Benda decision because the court refused to consider the mer-
its. Thus, the court virtually ignored the legal problem posed by 
the apparent conflict between the relaxed standard \)f review and 
the strict statutory presumption.88 
Application of the Hardships-Probable Success Balance 
After explaining the Inglis test, the Benda court began to 
apply it by discussing the relative hardships to the parties created 
by the trusteeship. Because the International was dispensing 
strike funds from the district lodge's treasury, and because the 
lodge was losing members, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
district court's finding that continued imposition of the trustee-
ship would cause the district lodge irreparable injuryY The harm 
to the International resulting from failure to pursue corporate-
wide bargaining, and to its entire membership, was never ade-
quately considered. The court "recognized that maintenance of 
control over subordinate groups is a reasonable concern."8S How-
ever, the court rejected this factor as not "the kind of irreparable 
injury with which equity is concerned, "89 thus concluding that 
any injury to the International was far outweighed by by the harm 
to the district lodge. 
Far more important than the court's discussion of hardships 
was its novel approach to the issue of probable success on the 
merits (i.e., that the injunction against the trusteeship would be 
upheld). In its application of this part of the test, the court never 
clearly elucidated what factors would constitute either a fair 
chance of success on the merits or an important question requir-
ing litigation. Rather, the court applied a hybrid standard: was 
there a "good faith doubt" that this trusteeship had been im-
posed for a proper purpose?70 
The Act provides that the proper purposes of a trusteeship 
65. 29 U.S.C. § 464(c)(1976). 
66. 584 F.2d at 316 nnA & 5. 
67. [d. at 315. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 316. It is unclear how the court's analysis of a "good faith doubt" corre-
sponds to the "clear and convincing evidence" standard required to rebut the statutory 
presumption of validity. 
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include "correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring 
performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties 
of a bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, 
or otherwis~ carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor 
organization."71 The International contended that the Benda 
trusteeship fit within both the "collective bargaining" and 
"legitimate objects" rubrics. 
Taking a narrow view of proper purpose, the Benda panel 
found that there was a good faith doubt that this trusteeship had 
a proper purpose. Specifically, the court rejected the Interna-
tional's argument that the proper purpose of the trusteeship was 
to ensure performance of the duties of the bargaining representa-
tive.72 Rather, it concluded that the nature and scope of bargain-
ing duties as between the district lodge and the International 
were unclear. Accordingly, it held that the trusteeship, imposed 
for the purpose of continuing corporate-wide bargaining, raised 
serious questions that could be litigated. Finally, the court re-
jected the International's contention that "union self-
preservation" legitimized the trusteeship imposed upon the dis-
trict lodge. 73 
Within the collective bargaining arena, the Act recognizes 
two distinguishable proper purposes for imposition of trustee-
ship.74 First, the Act provides that enforcement of preexisting 
collective bargaining agreements is proper.75 For example, if a 
local union indicates that it will strike even though the collective 
bargaining agreement contains a no strike clause, the interna-
tional may respond by placing the local in trusteeship.78 Second, 
the Act states that a proper purpose would be "assuring the per-
formance of ... other duties of a bargaining representative."77 In 
Gordon v. Laborers International Union of North America,78 the 
71. 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). 
72. 584 F.2d at 316. See 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). 
73. 584 F.2d at 317. 
74. [d. 
75. Virtually all trusteeship cases involving collective bargaining have dealt with this 
issue. See, e.g., Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477 
F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1973); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 
F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971); Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1970). 
76. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
77. 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1976). 
78. 490 F.2d 133 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/13
1980] LABOR LAW 395 
local union refused to associate with a district counciPU and 
reached a separate agreement with the employer that failed to 
provide for health and welfare and pension benefits. The Interna-
tional imposed a trusteeship on the grounds that failure to pro-
vide for such benefits constituted failure to perform the duties of 
a bargaining representative. The Tenth Circuit agreed and up-
held the trusteeship.8o 
The analogy to Benda is clear: the district lodge refused to 
join in continued corporate-wide bargaining, the apparent pur-
pose of which was to establish standards applicable to all employ-
ees in the industry, and instead reached a separate agreement 
with the employer. The court never addressed the differences in 
the contracts obtained; rather it asserted that since the division 
of responsibilities between the district lodge and the Interna-
tional were unclear, a "good faith doubt" as to proper purpose 
existed.8' 
The Benda court, failing to adequately deal with the Interna-
tional's contentions regarding bargaining duties, established a 
new standard: the court would defer to an international's notion 
of such duties only when the international was attempting to 
enforce "reasonably definite and precise collective bargaining res-
ponsibilities."82 Because the bargaining responsibilities in Benda 
were thought imprecise, the court noted that it would be 
"reluctant to allow a district court to rely solely on the collective 
bargaining rationale for imposing a trusteeship. "83 
However, in Benda, the International was not relying solely 
on the collective bargaining rationale; they also contended that 
their action furthered "other legitimate objects of a labor organi-
zation."8. Here, too, the court narrowly construed the Interna-
tional's contentions and established another new standard. The 
court noted that because "legitimate objects" was not defined in 
• 
79. Cf, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. Brown. 343 F.2d 872 (lOth Cir. 1965) 
(refusal to associate with a district council was not. in and of itself. sufficient grounds for 
imposing a trusteeship on a local union). 
80. 490 F.2d at 137. The Gordon court further noted that when imposition of a 
trusteeship turned on a question of the judgment of union officials. courts should be 
reluctant to intercede. 
81. 584 F.2d at 317. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. See 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). For the text of the statute. see note 3 supra. 
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the statute, "[a]n object of questionable legitimacy therefore 
subjects the trusteeship itself to good faith doubt."85 Thus, under 
the Ninth Circuit's somewhat circular reading of the statute, vir-
tually any trusteeship imposed under the "legitimate objects" 
rubic could be enjoined.86 
The court's discussion of "legitimate objects" failed to cor-
rectly characterize the International's stated motive for imposing 
the trusteeship, which was to protect itself from impotence as a 
labor organization. The Ninth Circuit termed this contention 
"self preservation, standing naked and alone."87 However, the 
goal of self preservation flows from the very nature of labor man-
agement relations. Indeed, the rationale behind the National 
Labor Relations Act was that employees must be able to band 
together and engage in concerted activity for their own self pro-
tection.88 The Benda court ignored the self preservation rationale 
and further ignored the Senate report on the trusteeship provi-
sions of the LMRDA, which seems to have recognized self preser-
vation as being a legitimate object of a trusteeship.89 By way of 
contrast, the Second Circuit in National Association of Letter 
Carriers v. Sombrotto90 noted that "[t]he union is entitled to 
protect itself, and actions taken toward this end appear to us 
directed toward a 'legitimate object' within the meaning of 29 
U.S.C. § 462."81 
The Benda court dismissed Sombrotto on the grounds that 
it involved self-preservation in the context of "well defined coll-
ective bargaining responsibilities ... "82 But in doing so, the 
Ninth Circuit failed to recognize the relationship between collec-
85. 584 F.2d at 316. 
86. The last statistical study of trusteeships indicates that fully 75% of them have 
been imposed under the rubric of "legitimate objects." Beaird, supra note 3, at 512. 
87. 584 F.2d at 317. 
88. Section 7, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); Statement of 
Purpose, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976). 
89. The Senate Report noted that trusteeships were proper "to preserve the integrity 
and stability of the organization itself." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted 
in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 2318, 2333. 
90. 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971). 
91. [d. at 922. Accord, Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and 
Joiners, 477 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1973) (trusteeship imposed for the purpose of preventing 
the local union from petitioning the NLRB for disaffiliation and separate certification was 
among the legitimate objects within the meaning of section 462 of the Act); McVicker v. 
International Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (district court upheld 
a trusteeship imposed for the purpose of preventing the local union from disaffiliation). 
92. 584 F.2d at 317. 
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tive bargaining responsibilities and self preservation. In Benda, 
the International attempted to conduct corporate-wide collective 
bargaining in order to pressure Lockheed Aircraft into signing a 
contract that would uniformly benefit its members. District 
Lodge 508 undercut this attempt by refusing to accede to the 
parent body's judgment as to the necessity for such a bargaining 
posture. These facts tend to show the interrelation between self 
preservation and the fulfillment of collective bargaining responsi-
bilities. 
Additionally, the International's action can be viewed in the 
context of union discipline. Several cases involving trusteeships 
have dealt with the issue of union discipline under the "other 
legitimate objects" rubric.93 These cases have focused on the rela-
tionship between the local and international union and the du-
ties, responsibilities, and benefits flowing between the two. A 
local union, as part .of a larger organization, gives up some of its 
rights in order to reap the benefits of concerted action. 94 Thus, 
where the local union wishes to stay within the international, it 
should. not be immune from discipline by the international 
body.95 Failure to comply with the reasonable demands of a par-
ent body subjects a local to such discipline.98 In Benda, the Inter-
national constitution specifically provided that a trusteeship 
could be imposed. The need for such discipline, in the context of 
the International's attempt to deal with a large and powerful 
employer, should have tipped the balance in favor of the trustee-
ship. The court failed to recognize the possibility that interna-
tional organizations have nation-wide collective bargaining res-
ponsibilities which may require local unions to accede to the ne-
cessity of common action. A trusteeship imposed to accomplish 
this end surely has as its purpose a "legitimate object." 
E. SIGNIFICANCE 
Benda stands for the proposition that in granting prelimi-
nary injunctive relief to a local union in trusteeship the key ele-
93. Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477 F.2d 612 
(2d Cir. 1973); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 
(2d Cir. 1971); McVicker v. International Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp.296 (N.D. Ohio 
1971). 
94. McVicker v. International Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. at 303. 
95. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d at 923, quoted 
in Executive Bd. Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 477 F.2d at 615. 
96. See Gordon v. Laborers Infl Union, 490 F.2d at 137; McVicker v. International 
Union of Dist. 50, 327 F. Supp. at 303. 
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ment is the relative hardships to the parties.U7 As the hardships 
tip more decidedly toward one party the necessity of showing a 
likelihood of success on the merits decreases. The statutory pre-
sumption will not weigh in that balance upon review of prelimi-
nary injunctive relief since the merits will not be reached until 
fully litigated at the permanent injunction hearing. This 
"merits" analysis will apply even where the grant of preliminary 
injunctive relief effectively terminates the dispute between the 
parties. In this respect, Benda is a unique decision, and therefore 
may be limited to its facts. No other decision involving trustee-
ships has skirted the merits when preliminary injunctive relief 
was the primary relief sought and effectively terminated the ac-
tion.u8 
Benda also represents a narrow reading by the Ninth Circuit 
of the proper purposes for imposing a trusteeship. An attempt to 
adjust collective bargaining duties between a local and interna-
tional will apparently subject any subsequent trusteeship to a 
good faith doubt that it was imposed for a proper purpose. Benda 
holds that a trusteeship will only be upheld when imposed to 
enforce "reasonably definite and precise collective bargaining res-
ponsibilities." Thus, Benda significantly limits an international's 
flexibility to adjust its bargaining posture to contend with 
changes in the industry. 
The truly significant limitation of the purpose for which a 
trusteeship may properly be imposed results from the court's in-
terpretation of "legitimate objects." Because the Benda court did 
not apply the statutory presumption, any trusteeship imposed 
under the legitimate objects rubric would seem to be subject to a 
good faith doubt that it was imposed for a proper purpose under 
the Act. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's reading of the trustee-
ship provisions of the LMRDA, international unions would be 
prevented from placing local unions in trusteeship except in cer-
tain well defined situations. 
Under Benda, international unions must meet stringent 
standards to impose trusteeships, absent clear-cut abuse by local 
unions. Also, international unions will not have the flexibility 
needed to deal with changing work patterns and rapidly evolving 
97. Benda has been cited for its standard ofreview. City of Anaheim v. Kleppe, 590 
F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir. 1978). 
98. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
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corporate structure. Benda's implication that an international 
must rigidly adhere to outmoded collective bargaining patterns 
while the corporate employer may make adjustments is grossly 
unfair. Limiting an international's flexibility will only help shift 
the relative strength of the parties toward the corporate em-
ployer. To respond to this situation, international unions would 
be well advised to include authority for corporate-wide bargain-
ing in their constitutions. Perhaps, if such authority were more 
specifically delegated to the international, courts might be more 
apt to approve intervention when a local refuses to accede to the 
reasonable demands of the international union. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Benda court did not consider the practical realities un-
derlying the dispute between District Lodge 508 and the Interna-
tional; it did not recognize that the grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion effectively terminated the litigation or that the International 
and District Lodge 508 had a unique collective bargaining rela-
tionship. As a result, it failed to reach the merits of the dispute 
or to fully confront the legal issues. Specifically, the court mistak-
enly failed to apply the statutory presumption of validity to the 
trusteeship and to require that the district lodge present clear and 
convincing evidence that the trusteeship was not imposed for a 
proper purpose. Finally, the Benda court narrowly construed the 
trusteeship provisions of the Act, virtually eliminating 
"legitimate objects" as a proper purpose. 
Robert Haden 
ill. REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF OSHA REGULATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor' (Todd), the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed an order of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission2 (Commission) finding that Todd 
Shipyards Corp. (Todd or the employer) had "repeatedly" vio-
lated workplace safety regulations promulgated by the Commis-
sion pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act3 
1. 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978) (per Choy, J.; the other panel members were Anderson, 
J. and Palmieri, D.J.) 
2. OSARHRC Docket No. 12510 (Dec. 22, 1975), 3 OSHC 1813 (1975). 
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). For 
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(OSHA or the Act). 
OSHA was enacted in 1970 in response to a very real crisis 
in American industry. In the years immediately preceding pas-
sage of the Act, over 14,000 job-related deaths were reported each 
year.4 In addition, over two million workers were disabled an-
nually through job-related accidents.5 In purely economic terms, 
the impact of occupational accidents and diseases was over-
whelming.a In human terms the cost was incalculable. Most pri-
vate employers were not seriously addressing the problemj7 far too 
often employers rationalized worker injuries as simply the cost of 
doing business.8 As a result, at the time of the passage of the Act 
these problems were getting worse, not better.& It was in this 
context, after nearly three years of debate and intense private-
employer opposition, that Congress passed the Act.1O 
The stated purpose of OSHA is "to assure so far as possible 
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions .... "11 To this end the Act empowers the 
Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to set standards to assure employ-
ees non-harardous working conditions. 12 Section 8(a) of OSHA 
authorizes the Secretary or his representatives to inspect work-
places for hazards or violations of OSHA regulations. 13 If hazards 
or violations are discovered, an inspector must issue a citation to 
the employer.u Thereafter, the employer is notified of the pen-
alty, if any, that the Secretary proposes to assess. 15 The system 
general information on OSHA, see M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 
(1978); R. HOGAN & R. HOGAN, OCCUPATiONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT (1977). 
4. S. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178. 
5.ld. 
6. Estimates of the economic cost, in terms of the annual loss to the Gross National 
Product, range upwards from $8 billion. [d. 
7. D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB 54-61 (1978); Nader, Forward in J. PAGE & M. 
O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES xiii (1973). 
8. Id. See generally E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS: ELEMENTS OF COST· 
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1973). See also R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 
34-37 (1976). 
9. S. REP. No. 91-1291, supra note 4, at 5180. 
10. J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 167-89. 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
12. Id. § 651(b)(3) (1976). Section 651(b)(3) further directs the Secretary to create a 
review commission to handle OSHA adjudicatory matters. 
13. [d. § 657(a) (1976). 
14. [d. § 658(8) (1976). 
15. [d. § 659(8) (1976). 
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of penalties is designed to provide employers with an incentive to 
comply with the safety requirements of the Act. '8 For non-serious 
violations, penalties are discretionary; 17 for serious violations pen-
alties are mandatory;'8 but in either case, the maximum penalty 
is $1,000.19 A willful violation may involve a penalty of up to 
$10,000.20 If an employer fails to prevent recurrences and a subse-
quent inspection turns up another violation involving a similar 
hazard to employees, the employer has repeatedly violated the 
standards and a penalty of up to $10,000 may be assessed.21 The 
question of what constitutes "repeatedly" violating OSHA stan-
dards was the principal issue in the Todd decision. 
The Todd Court held: 1) that the employer "repeatedly" 
violated the Act where the citation involved a recurrence at the 
same facility of a hazard similar to those described in earlier 
citations;22 2) that the citation for having repeatedly violated the 
Act provided sufficient notice to the employer even though it 
failed to specify the earlier violation upon which the repeat viola-
tion was based;23 and 3) that the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Marshall u. Barlow's Inc., 24 requiring a search 
warrant for a non-consensual OSHA inspection of an employer's 
premises, would not be retroactively applied so as to exclude 
evidence of violations obtained in a warrantless pre-Barlow's 
search.25 
16. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, supra note 4, at 5192-93; CONF. REp. No. 91-1765, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5228, 5237-38. 
17. 29 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1976). 
18. Id. § 666(b) (1976). 
19. Id. § 666(a), (b) (1976). 
20. Id. § 666(a) (1976). If a willful violation results in the death of an employee, the 
employer may be fined up to $10,000, or, upon conviction, imprisoned for up to six months, 
or both. If the employer has previously been convicted under this section, the fine may 
be increased up to $20,000. Id. 
21. Id. § 666(a) (1976). Penalty provisions for both willful and repeated violations are 
contained in this same subsection, which provides: "Any employer who willfully or repeat-
edly violates the requirements of section 654 of this title, any standard, rule, or order 
promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or regulations prescribed pursuant to 
this chapter may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation." 
Id. 
A repeat citation must be distinguished from a citation for failure to cure a prior 
violation. Section 17(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1976), provides penalties for failure 
to abate a violation in penalties of up to $1,000 "for each day during which such failure 
or violation continues." Id. 
22. 586 F.2d at 687. 
23. Id. at 688. 
24. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
25. 586 F.2d at 689. 
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Although the holding in Todd is hardly startling, the Ninth 
Circuit's interpretation of "repeated" violations under OSHA 
highlights a split in the circuits. 28 Further, Todd is the first post-
Barlow's case to deal with the retroactive application of the Su-
preme Court decision.27 
B. FACTS OF THE CASE 
Todd, a New York based corporation, operates a shipbuild-
ing and ship repair facility in San Pedro, California.28 On August 
30, and October 29, 1974, Todd was cited for "repeat" violations 
of an OSHA regulation requiring employers to provide employees 
working more than five feet above a solid surface with a proper 
scaffold or ladder.29 On January 30, 1975, Todd was again cited 
for a "repeat" violation of the same regulation. Todd contested 
the January 30 citation under section 10(c) of the Act.30 
26. See notes 36 to 42 infra and accompanying text. 
27. See notes 48 to 51 infra and accompanying text. 
28. 586 F.2d at 684. 
29. The regulation is contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1916.47(b) (1976), and provides in 
pertinent part: 
When employees are working aloft, or elsewhere at elevations 
more than 5 feet above a solid surface, either scaffolds or a 
sloping ladder, meeting the requirements of this subpart, shall 
be used to afford safe footing, or the employees shall be pro· 
tected by safety belts and lifelines meeting the requirements of 
§ 1916.84(b). 
Todd did not contest these citations and, accordingly, they became final orders of the 
Commission pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). 
Unfortunately, the specific facts surrounding Todd's violations are not known. The 
inspector's citations merely described the general nature of the alleged violation. 586 F.2d 
at 684 n.3. In addition, the parties to this litigation stipulated to the facts. Id. at 685 n. 
4. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that failure to provide scaffolding or other suitable 
safety equipment may subject workers to particularly serious injury. Thus, many states 
have enacted specific legislation requiring the use of scaffolding. See, e.g., Ill. REV. STAT. 
ch. 48, §§ 60·69 (1973). For a discussion of the Illinois Scaffold Act see Ring, The 
Scaffold Act: Its Past, Present & Future, 64 ILL. B.J. 666·80 (1976). California has had 
a similar code provision since 1913. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 7150·58 (West 1971). 
There is an apparent discrepancy as to inspection dates in the Todd opinion. The first 
inspection which revealed a violation of the scaffold regulation is noted to have occurred 
on August 30, 1974. 586 F.2d at 684. Later, on the same page of the opinion, the court 
mentions the date as having been August 27. Id. 
30. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976). Todd was cited for other violations during the January 
30 inspection but because these violations do not figure in the Ninth Circuit's resolution 
of Todd, further discussion of them has been omitted. 
As a result of the JanUfuy 30 inspection, Todd was also cited for a repeat violation of 
29 C.F.R. § 1916.51(b) (1976), failing to maintain "good housekeeping conditions." The 
administrative law judge concluded that the "repeat" violations of the regulation should 
be struck from the January 30 citation and the Commission agreed. Because the Secretary 
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An administrative law judge found that the violations were 
not identical and did not occur on the same vessel. 31 The judge 
ruled that "repeat" violations must be committed "more than 
once" and "in a manner which 'flaunts' [sic] the requirements 
of the Act."32 Because he found that the violations did not mani-
fest a flouting of the Act, the judge concluded the January 30 
violation could not be the basis of a repeat citation.33 
The Secretary of Labor then petitioned the Commission to 
review the decision of the administrative law judge.34 The Com-
mission reversed and imposed a fine of $160 for the January 30 
"repeat" violation.35 Todd appealed.38 
C. THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Repeat Violations 
The Todd court dealt with three legal issues. The first issue 
involved interpreting the meaning of "repeatedly." Todd asked 
the Ninth Circuit to join the Third Circuit37 in holding that penal-
ties for repeatedly violating OSHA regulations should be imposed 
only when the employer had flouted OSHA standards through at 
least three violations of the same regulation. However, the Todd 
Court declined to adopt this interpretation.3s Instead, the court 
held that penalties for repeatedly violating OSHA safety regula-
tions could be assessed whenever a citation involved a recurrence 
at the same facility of a hazard similar to those described in 
earlier citation.3u In support of this conclusion, the Court first 
noted that Congress authorized fines in order to encourage com-
did not cross appeal the Commission ruling, the repeat charge on the second housekeeping 
violation was not before the court in Todd. The repeat charge for violation of the scaffold 
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1916.47(b), resulted from a third violation of the standard. There-
fore. the court's language. defining a repeat violation as a second occurrence, can arguably 
be considered dictum. 
31. 586 F.2d at 684. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976) provides authority for this review. 
35. 3 OSHC 1813 (1975). 
36. Authority for appeal of a Commission order is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) 
(1976). 
37. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 540 
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976); Annot., 41 A.L.R. Fed. 146 (1977). 
38. 586 F.2d at 686. 
39. [d. at 687. Though this issue appears clear cut, there are limits to the Todd 
Court's holding vis-a-vis "repeated" violations. See notes 74 to 78 infra and accompanying 
text. 
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pliance with OSHA regulations!O Thus, when those fines failed 
to achieve the desired result and employers continued to violate 
the same safety regulations greater penalties were needed to in-
sure future compliance!' The Court further noted that the Secre-
tary of Labor had cited Todd on several occasions. Because the 
penalties imposed had not proved adequate to deter another vio-
lation, the court concluded that the more severe sanctions for 
repeatedly violating the regulations were properly imposed. In 
sum, a second citation could trigger the enhanced penalty for 
repeated violations!2 
Notice 
Todd next contended that the Secretary's January 30 cita-
40. 586 F.2d at 686. 
41. [d. 
42. The Act does not mandate the Commission to impose enhanced penalties for 
repeat citations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976); see note 21 supra. Nevertheless, if penalties 
are assessed the Commission must consider "the size of the business of the employer being 
charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of 
previous violations." 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1976). These factors must figure in every compu-
tation of a penalty under the Act. [d. 
The OSHA Field Operations Manual, Part XI - C 8 b, c, and d, sets forth the following 
mandatory guidelines for inspectors assessing a penalty for repeat violations: 
b. Gravity and penalty factors. 
For repeated violations which are not willful, the gravity of 
each violation will be evaluated and new penalty determined 
as for serious and other violations. Although an alleged viola-
tion(s) is a repetition of a previous violation, it may differ in 
one factor or more relating to gravity; therefore, gravity must 
be reassessed for each repetition. Absent special circumstances, 
once the gravity based penalty is arrived at, it is doubled for 
the first repeated violation and quadrupled if the violation has 
been cited and repeated twice. If a third repetition of a previous 
violation occurs, multiply the gravity-based penalty by 10. For 
any further repetition the Areas Director should consult with 
the Regional Administrator who may in tum consult with the 
Regional Solicitor. 
c. No initial proposed penalty. 
If there was no initial proposed penalty assessed for a violation, 
the minimum gravity-based penalty, absent special circum-
stances, shall be $100 for a repeat violation. 
d. Adjustment factors. 
In calculating the adjusted penalty, the adjustment factors 
(except size) should be recalculated downward. Good faith 
would ordinarily not be applied since the employer has exhib-
ited a lack of good faith by repeating the violation. The history 
factor shall take into consideration all previously cited viola-
tion(s). 
U.S. DEpt'. OF LABOR, OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 87 (CCH ed. 1979). 
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tion contravened the Act's notice requirement because it did not 
"describe with particularity" the earlier violations which formed 
the basis for the "repeat" citation.43 The Todd Court easily dis-
posed of this issue}4 First, the court noted that citations should 
be "liberally read. "45 Second, because all the citations referred to 
the same regulation number, "Todd could easily have determined 
which earlier citations were the basis for the repeat charge."48 
Finally, Todd could simply have requested more detailed infor-
mation. 47 
Retroactive Application of Barlow's 
Third, Todd contended that Barlow's should be retroactively 
applied and that all evidence seized in the warrantless search of 
its premises should be excluded as fruit of a violation of the fourth 
amendment. However, Barlow's involved an action for declara-
tory relief and merely held that non-consensual warrantless 
searches by OSHA inspectors were violative offourth amendment 
rights,4s Barlow's did not address the application ofthe exclusion-
43. The notice requirement contained in 29 U .S.C. § 658(a) (1976) provides that each 
citation "shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation, including a reference 
to the provisions of the chapter, standard, rule, regulation, or order alleged to have been 
violated. " 
44. This is not to imply that the notice issue is always so easy. In Todd, the Court 
limited its notice holding to the facts. 586 F .2d at 688. 
45. Id. at 687. "Liberally read" refers to the liberal construction afforded administra-
tive pleadings. "Enforcement of the Act would be crippled if the Secretary were inflexibly 
held to a narrow construction of citations issued by his inspectors." National Realty and 
Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257,1264 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
46. 586 F.2d at 687. 
47. 29 U.S.C. § 661(f) (1976) provides that Commission records shall be open and 
available to the public. 
48. 436 U.S. at 325. To date the most complete treatment of Barlow's is contained 
in Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Administrative Inspections and the Fourth 
Amendment, 9 ENVT'L L. 149 (1978). For briefer treatment of Barlow's see Note, Search 
Warrants, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79 (1979); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.: OSHA Needs a 
Warrant, 57 N.C. L. REV. 320 (1979); Note, OSHA Warrantless Unconsented Administra-
tive Inspections of Business Premises Held Unconstitutional, 55 N.D. L. Rev. 95 (1979); 
Note, Warrant Requirement for OSHA Inspections, 46 TENN. L. REV. 446 (1979); Note, 
Propriety of Warrantless Searches by OSHA Inspectors, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 815 (1979) 
Note, Administrative Searches, 92 HARv. L. REV. 210 (1978); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, 
Inc. and the Warrant Requirement for OSHA "Spot Check" Inspections, 15 IDAHO L. REv. 
187 (1978); Note, Administrative Searches, 14 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 119 (1978). 
The Supreme Court in Barlow's also set forth probable cause guidelines for obtaining 
warrants for OSHA searches. The Court did not require probable cause in the criminal 
law sense, but rather mandated a variable standard. For purposes of an administrative 
search such as this probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not 
only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that "reasonable 
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ary rule to OSHA searches. 
The Todd court had little difficulty with this issue. The 
court began by noting that the Supreme Court had never applied 
the exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding.48 Also, the exclusion-
ary rule has not been retroactively applied in many criminal 
cases.5O Because OSHA inspectors were acting "pursuant to ap-
parent congressional authority" under "then-prevailing constitu-
tional norms" neither the deterrent effect of the exch,lsionary rule 
nor the imperative of judicial integrity would be served by exclud-
ing evidence of the dangerous condition discovered on Todd's 
premises. 51 
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an. . . inspection are satisfied with 
respect to a particular [establishment]." 436 U.S. at 320, citing Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 533, 538 (1967). 
But these guidelines are hardly specific. Thus, lower courts have been left with the 
task of fleshing out probable cause requirements under Barlow's. 
In California, the State Court of Appeal for the Fifth District recently held that 
because criminal sanctions permeated the penalty provisions of California OSHA 
(Cal/OSHA), CAL. LAB. CODE § 6300·6708 (Deering Supp. 1979) (enacted in 1973), inspec-
tion warrants must meet criminal probable cause requirements. Salwasser Mfg. Inc. v. 
Municipal Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 223 (1979). The California Legislature reacted to 
Salwasser by enacting legislation defining probable cause criteria for CAL/OSHA inspec-
tion warrants as follows: 
. Cause for the issuance of a warrant shall be deemed to exist if 
there has been an industrial accident, injury, or illness re-
ported, if any complaint that violations of occupational safety 
and health standards exist at the place of employment has been 
received by the division, or if the place of employment to be 
inspected has been chosen on the basis of specific neutral cri-
teria contained in a general administrative plan for the enforce-
ment of this division. 
1979 Cal. Legis. Servo ch. 241, § l(b) (West 1979) (enacted July 10, 1979) (to be codified 
as CAL. LAB. CODE § 6314(b». 
A nation-wide survey of post-Barlow's litigation on the issue of the warrant require-
ment and probable cause is beyond the scope of this case note. Since there is no apparent 
consensus on its interpretation, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court will be called 
upon to more clearly define its holding in Barlow's. 
49. 586 F.2d at 689. 
50. 1d. at 689-90. 
51. 1d. at 690. There are two rationales for the exclusionary rule. First, excluding 
illegally seized evidence is designed to deter police misconduct. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). Second, exclusion of illegal evidence is said to further "the imperative of 
judicial integrity." United States V. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975). The Todd Court's 
analysis of retroactive application of the exclusionary rule to OSHA searches was followed 
in Savina Home Industries V. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979). In 
Savina, the Tenth Circuit defined the issue thus: "[A]ssuming that the exclusionary rule 
would be available in any event, the issue is whether the rule is retroactively applicable 
to a pre-Barlow's inspection." 1d. at 1363. The court concluded that retroactive applica-
tion would neither further the imperative of judicial integrity nor deter police misconduct. 
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Of the three issues presented, only the interpretation of 
"repeatedly" makes new law. Retroactive application of the ex-
clusionary rule presented the Todd Court with a "novel" subject 
for discussion;52 nevertheless, this issue was rather simple in view 
of the precedent. The more important issue revolved around the 
definition of "repeatedly." Accordingly, the remainder of this 
note addresses that topic alone. 
D. DISCUSSION AND CRmQUE 
Todd was not the first case in which the Ninth Circuit was 
called upon to interpret the meaning of "repeatedly." In a similar 
case one year prior to Todd, the Court affirmed a Commission 
ruling assessing, against the same employer, a penalty for repeat-
edly violating OSHA regulations. In Todd Shipyards v. Secretary 
of Labor (Todd Shipyards),53 the Ninth Circuit held that 
"violations which were identical in character, occurred on the 
same ship and took place within three months of each other" were 
properly classified as repeated.5• However, in Todd Shipyards the 
Court limited its holding to the facts of that case; the Ninth 
Circuit did not address the general question of what constitutes 
a repeat violation.55 Nonetheless, in Todd Shipyards the Court 
rejected the Third Circuit's definition of a repeat violation as set 
forth in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (Bethlehem 
Steel). se 
• 
The Third Circuit's definition of "repeatedly" hinged on a . 
narrow reading of the Act. First, the Third Circuit, using a dic-
tionary definition of the term, determined that "repeatedly," the 
adverbial form of the noun, meant "again and again."57 Thus, the 
Court concluded that the second violation of a regulation could 
never form the basis of a citation for repeatedly violating OSHA 
standards.58 Next, the Third Circuit equated "repeatedly" with 
"willfully" because both terms formed the basis for the same 
Therefore, the court held that the rule, if applied at all, should only be applied prospec· 
tively. [d. 
52. 586 F.2d at 688. 
53. 566 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977) (per Ely, J.j the other panel members were Kennedy, 
J. and Ferguson, D.J.). 
54. [d. at 1331. 
55. [d. at 1331 n. 6. 
56. [d. at 1331. 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976). 
57. [d. at 160. 
58. [d. at 162. 
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penalty under the Act: civil fines of up to $10,000.59 Accordingly, 
the court held that in order to assess a penalty for repeatedly 
violating OSHA standards, the employer would have had to vio-
late the same standard more than twice, in a manner which evi-
denced a flouting of the Act.50 
In Todd Shipyards, the Ninth Circuit wisely rejected this 
analysis.81 First, they noted that the dictionary definition of 
"repeatedly" did not comport with the legislative h.istory of the 
Act.82 Indeed, the Conference Committee on OSHA used the 
terms "repeatedly" and "repeated" interchangeably.83 Thus, the 
Court found that a strict interpretation of the word, based on its 
adverbial form in the Act, was not required. Second, the Ninth 
Circuit emphasized that the terms "repeatedly" and "willfully" 
were joined by the disjunctive "or."B4 Therefore, there was no 
evidence that Congress intended that the terms have the same 
meaning.55 . 
In Todd, the Court reiterated these criticisms of the Third 
Circuit's test for repeated violations.55 The court did not limit this 
holding to the facts of the case, but rather joined the Fourth 
Circuit in establishing a general standard for repeat citation:'7 a 
"recurrence at the same facility of a hazard similar to those de-
scribed in the earlier citation," will expose the employer to penal-
ties for repeatedly violating an OSHA standard.88 
59. 1d. at 161. 
60. 1d. at 162. 
61. 566 F.2d at 1331. 
62. Id. at 1330-31 n.fi. 
63. CONF. REp. No. 91-1765, supra note 16, at 5237·38. 
64. 566 F.2d at 1331. 
65. 1d. at 1331 n.5. As to penalties, the court noted that OSHA vested the Secretary 
with discretion to assess appropriate fines that would help insure future compliance with 
OSHA standards. As the Todd Shipyards court viewed the Act, willful violations were in 
general more serious than repeated violations but it was nonetheless important that the 
Secretary have the discretion to enforce OSHA as he saw fit, taking into consideration 
the peculiarities of each individual case. 
66. 586 F.2d at 686. In addition, the Todd court noted that the Third Circuit's view 
of repeated violations would result in virtual elimination of repeat violation penalties. 
This fear had also been voiced in Todd Shipyards. 566 F.2d at 1331 n.6. 
67. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 
582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978). However, the Todd Court declined to adopt the Fourth 
Circuit's more sweeping definition of "repeatedly." The Hyman Court held that only "a 
single prior infraction need be proven to invoke the repeated violation sanctions author-
ized by the Act." 1d. at 839. 
68. 586 F.2d at 687. 
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The split in the circuits over the definition of "repeatedly," 
combined with OSHA's venue provisions, creates a curious anom-
aly that will undoubtedly affect future litigation of other OSHA 
provisions. The Act provides that an employer may raise legal 
issues concerning OSHA in one of three places: the circuit where 
a violation occurs, the circuit where the employer has its principal 
office or in the District of Columbia Circuit.au With the split in 
the circuits, an employer could conceivably obtain relief in its 
principal office's circuit even though it would be denied relief in 
the circuit where the violation occurred. For example, the repeat 
violation which formed the basis of the Third Circuit's holding in 
Bethlehem Steel actually occurred at the San Pedro, California 
shipyard, the situs of the Todd case.70 However, because Bethle-
hem was a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of busi-
ness in that state, it brought its action in the Third Circuit and 
obtained relief. Todd, a New York corporation, sought relief in 
the Ninth Circuit, where the violation occurred, and was denied 
relief. The problems of OSHA enforcement caused by this forum 
shopping opportunity are obvious: an OSHA inspector will not 
know what standard to apply when inspecting two employers 
with side-by-side facilities. 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that so much litiga-
tion should occur over the definition of "repeatedly." Perhaps 
this results from general employer opposition to OSHA or fear 
that the Commission will assess larger penalties in the future.71 
But even so, neither Congress nor the courts should escape blame 
for this situation. The use of the term "repeatedly" without statu-
tory definition in the Act is clearly a case of poor drafting. 72 Fur-
69. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976). 
70. 540 F.2d at 158-59. 
71. The penalty imposed in Todd was $160. 586 F.2d at 685. In Todd Shipyards, two 
separate repeat violations resulted in total fines of $1,050. 566 F.2d at 1329. The fine in 
Bethlehem Steel was only $60. 540 F.2d at 159. Obviously, these large corporations were 
not litigating over· the definition ofrepeatedly because of the fines ill}posed. Perhaps this 
willingness to engage in expensive litigation can be better characterized as an attempt to 
limit OSHA in any way possible. See, e.g., D. BERMAN, supra note 7, at 187. 
72. This is not surprising given the circumstances surrounding enactment of OSHA. 
There was intense pressure on Congress from every side, the Executive, business, and 
labor. For an interesting description and discussion of OSHA's birth, see J. PAGE & M. 
O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 167-89. Congress could perhaps have prevented this plethora of 
litigation by placing the penalty provisions for willful and repeat violations in separate 
subparagraphs, and by using the adjectival form of each word. The Commission would 
still have the authority to develop a more precise working definition of the terms and could 
ameliorate harshness through discretionary use of penalty enhancement. 
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ther, the courts only invite relitigation of identical legal issues 
when they limit their holding to the facts of claim that they "need 
not dispose" of core issues.73 In this light, Todd can hardly be 
faulted for asking the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the very argu-
ments made one year earlier in Todd Shipyards. 
Unfortunately, Todd does not seem to provide a final answer 
on the meaning of "repeatedly." The Ninth Circuit strongly 
hinted that there are limits to its holding. First, the Todd court 
held that a repeat citation must be based on a recurrence of a 
similar hazard.74 However, the court did not explain the meaning 
of a "similar" hazard, but merely noted that a similar hazard was 
involved in Todd.75 Second, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its hold-
ing in Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission78 that a penalty may only be assessed ifthe employer 
"knew or should have known of the existence of an employee 
violation."77 Finally, the Todd Court expressly left open the ques-
tion of whether a repeat citation could be vitiated by the passage 
of time.1S Thus it would seem that Todd or others may relitigate 
these issues.78 The Ninth Circuit holding in Todd is that a 
"repeat" citation, with concomitant penalties, may be founded 
upon a recurrence of a hazard similar to that described in earlier 
citations, and that the exclusionary rule will not be retroactively 
applied to a pre-Barlow's warrantless search. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Citations for repeat violations of OSHA standards are an 
important part of the scheme for achieving employer compliance 
73. 566 F.2d at 1331 n.6. 
74. 586 F.2d 687. 
75. [d. at 686 n.7. 
76. 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1976). 
77. [d. at 1145. 
78. 586 F.2d at 687 n.8. 
79. The Court's method of dismissing issues that it feels are not germane to Todd 
invites further litigation. For example, the court sidestepped the question of how similar 
the hazards ·must be by limiting its holding to the particular facts in Todd. [d. at 686 
n.7. Similarly, the Court expressly refused to address the issue of whether "the passage 
of some length of time between citations would prevent basing a repeat citation on the 
earlier occurrence" because the three violations in Todd occurred within a five-month 
period. [d. at 687 n.8. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit could prevent needless litigation by 
noting that resolution of these issues is within the final purview of the Commission. Such 
an approach might add needed weight to Commission interpretations; it also might help 
convince future litigants that United States Circuit Courts of Appeal should not be looked 
to as the sole and final authority on the Act. 
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with safety standards. so The Ninth Circuit's holding in the con-
text of the overall structure and intent of the Act should be clear. 
By interpreting "repeatedly" as "any recurrence" the Ninth Cir-
cuit has put employers on notice that more severe penalties will 
be imposed unless hazardous working conditions are eliminated 
after the first citation. When the dangerous condition is one cre-
ating a serious risk of harm to workers, it is particularly impor-
tant that the employer immediately correct the violation and 
prevent its recurrence. Congress has mandated that employers 
must provide a safe place of employment for all workers. Todd, 
as far as it goes, helps to further that goal. 
Robert Haden 
IV. SINGLE EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN AFTER 
WITHDRAWAL FROM MULTIEMPLOYER UNIT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,1 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
effect of the timely withdrawal of two employers from a multi-
employer bargaining unit on their duty to bargain with the union 
which they had previously recognized upon joining the multi-
employer unit. In the first of a number of factually similar labor 
cases decided this term, the Court held that the withdrawing 
employers had a duty to bargain within their respective single-
employer units based on the presumption of the union's continu-
ing majority status. 
B. FACTS OF THE CASE 
In 1959, a voluntary combination of restaurant and casino 
employers formed the Reno Employers Council (the Council) and 
engaged in multi-employer bargaining with the Hotel-Motel & 
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders' Union (the Union). Upon 
joining the Council, each employer voluntarily 'recognized the 
Union as the bargaining representative of its employees. Repre-
sentation elections were never held in either the single employer 
80. [d. at 685. 
1. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978) (per Anderson, J.; 
the other panel members were Trask, J. and Grant, D.J.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2847 
(1979). 
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units or in the multi-employer unit. 2 The employers, Nevada 
Lodge and Tahoe Nugget3 (the Employers), who had never bar-
gained with the Union on an individual basis, joined the Council 
in 1959 and 1962, respectively, and became parties to a series of 
three-year contracts, the last of which was to expire in November, 
1974. In September of that year, these Employers withdrew from 
the Council in a timely manner and subsequently refused to rec-
ognize or to bargain with the Union.· 
The Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board) alleging a refusal to 
bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act5 (the Act). The Union contended that the employers 
had a duty to bargain within the newly created single employer 
units based upon the Union's presumed continuing majority sta-
tus. a The Board found that the presumption of continuing major-
ity status arising from an employer's voluntary recognition of a 
union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees 
continues after the employer withdraws from a multi-employer 
unit.1 In addition, the Board found that the employers failed to 
prove that their refusal to bargain was predicated on a reasonably 
grounded good faith doubt as to the Union's continuing majority 
status.s The Board ordered the employers to bargain with the 
umon. 
In NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,8 the Board petitioned the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of its bargaining order. 
Again, the Employers contended that the presumption of major-
ity status was inapplicable after a timely withdrawal from a 
multi-employer unit, and that, even if it were applicable, a rea-
sonable doubt as to the union's majority status had been proved. 
2. 584 F.2d at 296. 
3. Tahoe Nugget and Nevada Lodge were consolidated on appeal. In addition to the 
refusal to bargain violation, Nevada Lodge also involved an independent 8{a)(1) violation 
which wi1l not be considered in this note. Nevada Lodge, 227 N.L.R.B. 368 (1976). 
4. 584 F.2d at 296. For the basic principles relating to a timely withdrawal, see note 
29 infra and accompanying text. 
5. Section 8{a){5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that "(a) lilt shall 
be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of § 159{a) of this title." 29 
U.S.C. § 158{a){5) (1976). 
6. 584 F.2d at 296. 
7. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 357 (1976). 
8. [d. at 357-58. 
9. 584 F.2d at 296. 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the Employers' arguments and 
granted enforcement. 10 This note will focus on the Ninth Circuit's 
application of the presumption of continuing majority status to 
a single employer bargaining unit following an employer's timely 
withdrawal from a multi-employer unit. In addition, it will ana-
lyze the "good faith doubt" defense as affected by the court's 
extension of the Bryan Manufacturing ll rule precluding the use 
of events occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the 
unfair labor practice charge as evidence of an employer's good 
faith doubt. 
C. THE PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUING MAJORITY STATUS 
To sustain a refusal to bargain charge against an employer, 
the Board's General Counsel must prove that the union involved 
represented a majority of that employer's employees on the re-
fusal to bargain date. 12 The majority status of an incumbent 
union is generally proven by evidentiary presumptions, which are 
sufficient, if unrebutted, to establish an employer's duty to bar-
gain,,3 
The usual justification for use of presumptions is that such 
a degree of probability exists that the fact presumed reflects real-
ity that the presumption is an appropriate procedural substitute 
for evidence." The basis for the presumption of an incumbent 
union's continued majority status, however, is "primarily policy 
.; it is a vehicle for maintaining industrial peace."15 The use 
10. [d. at 308. 
11. Local Lodge #1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Manufacturing), 362 U.S. 411 (1960). See 
note 60 infra and accompanying text. 
12. This requirement is mandated by § 9(a) of the Act which provides, in part, that: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit 
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive bargaining 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur· 
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, 
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976)(emphasis added). 
13. Komatz Constr., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 458 F.2d 317, 326 (8th Cir. 1976); Terrell Mach. 
Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 929 (1970); Bartenders, Hotel·Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n of 
Pocatello, Idaho, 213 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974). 
14. NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1972); Ref·Chem Co. v. 
NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 130·31 (5th Cir. 1969); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 807 (1972); 29 
AM.JUR.20 Evidence § 165 (1967). 
15. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d at 303. Section 1 of the Act sets forth the 
preservation of industrial peace as a primary goal of labor legislation: "Experience has 
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of this presumption to achieve stability in established bargaining 
relationships can be a source of conflict with another major goal 
of the Act-that of ensuring employee freedom of choice in the 
selection of a bargaining representative. 18 The tension in the Act 
between these two goals is apparent from an analysis of the rights 
guaranteed employees under section 7 of the Act.17 This section 
guarantees employees the right to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing. Implicit in this section is 
the right to change representatives or, as spelled out by the Taft· 
Hartley Amendments to section 7, "the right to refrain from" 
being represented by any labor organization at all. 18 In spite of the 
policy favoring freedom of choice, "[t]he presumption that a 
bargaining relationship, lawfully established, lawfully continued 
is embedded in the statute and precedent. Unrepresented and 
represented employees are both presumed to desire continuation 
of the existing status in the absence of proof to the contrary."19 
This "common expectation of continuity"20 has been embodied in 
proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively 
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of 
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest. . . ." 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 
16. The preamble to the Act provides, in part, that: 
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate 
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow 
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions 
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise 
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organizatio~, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 
17. Section 7 of the Act provides that: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the 
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title: 
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
18. Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining Representatives, 47 TUL. L. 
REV. 961 (1972-73). 
19. Tahoe Nugget, 227 N.L.R.B. at 358 n.8. 
20.Id. 
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the rule that both Board-certified21 and voluntarily recognized22 
unions enjoy an irebuttable presumption of majority status for 
either one year after the Board certifies the union, or for a reason-
able time, generally one year, after an employer voluntarily recog-
nizes the union. In addition, after the expiration of the year, a 
rebuttable presumption of continuing majority status is em-
ployed. 23 
Although these presumptions are normally applied within 
the context of union recognition, they have been applied outside 
the original relationship. The most notable example of this is in 
the "successorship" context where the Supreme Court has held 
that successor employers who hire a majority of a predecessor's 
employees must recognize and bargain with the incumbent 
union. 24 In NLRB u. Tahoe Nugget, the Ninth Circuit extended 
the application of the presumption of continuing majority status 
to a new context when it held that the presumption survives an 
employer's timely withdrawal from a multi-employer unit and 
that, in this context, employee freedom of choice must "subserve 
the goal of industrial peace."25 
21. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835 
(9th Cir. 1978); Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1975); Celanese 
Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), reu'd on other grounds, Hawaii Meat Co., Ltd., 
139 N.L.R.B. 966, 968 (1962). 
22. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944). 
23. NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Gallaro, 
419 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1969); Bartenders, Hotel Motel Restaurant Employers Bargaining 
Ass'n of Pocatello, Idaho, 213 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974); Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 
(1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970). 
24. NLRB v. Burns Int'1. Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). Burns "recognizes that 
in at least some circumstances, the democratic principle embodied in § 9 of the National 
Labor Relations Act is not offended by procedures which leave some doubt as to the 
actual, immediate desires of employees with respect to representation." Zim's Foodliner, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). 
25. No prior cases were found which applied the presumption of continuing majority 
status to an employer who timely withdrew from an employer association. However, cases 
in a parallel context imply that the presumption was not employed after timely with-
drawal of a union from multi-employer bargaining. Because a union has the same right 
to withdraw from a multi-employer bargaining unit as does an employer, employers have 
been required to bargain with unions on a single-employer basis following the union's 
timely withdrawal from the multi-employer unit. Decisions and bargaining orders issued 
in this context, however, have not been predicated on the presumption of the union's 
continuing majority status within the single-employer unit. For example, in Adams Fur-
nace Co., Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1966), the Board held that the union was entitled to 
an election at each employer member's separate unit since the union had given the em-
ployer association and each member written and timely notice of its intent to abandon 
multi-employer bargaining and to negotiate on an individual basis. In Publishers' Ass'n 
of New York City v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1966), the court enforced the Board's 
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Background and Court's Analysis 
Although multi-employer units are nowhere mentioned in 
the Act, the Supreme Court has recognized that this type of bar-
gaining mechanism is "a vital factor in the effectuation of the 
national policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened 
collective bargaining."26 Unlike other bargaining units,27 the 
multi-employer unit is consensual. 
Essential to the establishment of such a unit is the 
unequivocal manifestation by the employer mem-
bers of the group that all of them intend to be 
bound in future collective bargaining by group 
rather than individual action. The formation of 
the mUlti-employer unit, moreover, must be en-
tirely voluntary, the assent of the union having 
representative status also being required. The 
Board will not sanction the creation of such a unit 
over the objection of any party union or em-
ployer.28 
While an employer's decision to participate in multi-
employer bargaining is essentially voluntary, withdrawal from 
group bargaining is permitted only under certain conditions. 
Once negotiations have begun, a member of a multi-employer 
bargaining group cannot withdraw and avoid the results of group 
bargaining without the consent of both the participating union 
and the employer group. An untimely withdrawal attempt will 
not relieve the employer from the obligation to abide by whatever 
bargaining order and held that the union's withdrawal was timely and that individual 
units were appropriate. In that case, however, it was conceded by the court that the union 
had a majority of employees in each individual unit. Finally, in Evening News Associa-
tion, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enforced, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967), the Board found 
that the employer had violated the Act by refusing to bargain individual1y with the union 
which had effectively withdrawn from multi-employer bargaining. It held that there was 
no basis for treating unions differently from employers: 
[i)n either case [after the employer's or the union's timely 
withdrawal) ... , the union may be faced with the possibility 
of having to demonstrate that it has been designated by a ma-
jority of the employees in the individual employer units result-
ing from the breakup of the multi-employer unit, if it is to 
retain its status as the bargaining representative of such em-
ployees. 
154 N.L.R.B. at 1499. For cases which have held that the presumption does not survive 
an employer's withdrawal from a Board-certified multi-employer unit, see note 45 infra. 
26. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union #449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957). 
27. General1y, the determination of the appropriate unit for the purposes of col1ec-
tively bargaining is the responsibility of the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). 
28. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW at 238-39 (1971) (footnote omitted). 
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contract terms are ultimately negotiated.29 
Unions which participate in multi-employer bargaining may 
be either certified or voluntarily recognized and the usual irre-
buttable and rebuttable presumptions of continuing majority sta-
tus apply.30 In Tahoe Nugget, the court employed three addi-
tional presumptions in reaching its conclusion that the presump-
tion of continuing majority status survives an employer's timely 
withdrawal from a multi-employer unit and subjects the single 
employer who is unable to rebut that presumption to a duty to 
bargain. 
The first presumption was that majority status existed 
within the single employer unit prior to the employer's entry into 
the multi-employer bargaining unit,31 since the Employers would 
not have violated the law by recognizing a minority union. That 
Employers would not recognize a minority union stems from the 
major limitation on an employer's freedom to enter into a multi-
employer unit: the consent requirement. An employer cannot uni-
laterally, without the express or implied consent of a majority of 
its employees, bind them to representation in a multi-employer 
unit. At the time an employer joins a multi-employer unit, the 
relevant group of employees for determining a union's majority 
status as bargaining representative is the employees of the single 
employer unit. 32 A violation of this consent requirement would 
subject employers to a charge of restraining or interfering with the 
employees' section 7 rights. 33 Because the court presumed that 
29. NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,385 
U.S. 1005 (1967). The basic principles relating to withdrawal are as follows: (1) the notice 
of withdrawal from the multi-employer unit must be sent to both the employer association 
and to the union and must be received "before the date set by the contract for notice of 
modification or termination or before the agreed-upon date to begin mUlti-employer nego-
tiations, whichever occurs sooner. (2) The withdrawal must be unequivocal, and subse-
quent participation in the group negotiations or de facto compliance with the resulting 
contract absent indepeneent negotiations may nullify an otherwise effective withdrawal. 
(3) Withdrawal may be accomplished at any time, if both the employer group and the 
union clearly consent." Kirshman, Withdrawal from Multi-Employer Bargaining, 46 L.A. 
B. BULL. 220, 225 (1971). 
30. See notes 18 to 23 supra and accompanying text. 
31. 584 F.2d at 303. 
32. C. MORRIS, supra note 28, at 240. 
33. Two cases which hold that employers violate § 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) where they 
bind their employees to representation in a multi-employer unit without the express or 
implied consent of their employees are Dancker & Sellew, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 824 (1963), 
alrd sub nom., NLRB v. Local 210, 330 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1964); Mohawk Business Mach. 
Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 248 (1956). 
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the Employers would not have violated the law, they inferred that 
a majority of the single unit employees expressly or impliedly 
gave their consent to representation in the multi-employer unit. 34 
The court's second presumption was that this initial majority 
status within the single employer unit "subsisted" throughout 
the employer's participation in the multi-employer unit.3s Once 
an employer has joined the multi-employer unit, the relevant 
majority for determining representation status switches from the 
employees in the single-employer unit to the aggregate employees 
in the multi-employer unit.38 At this point, loss of majority sup-
port within the single employer unit becomes irrelevant to the 
union's status as the bargaining representative of the employees 
within the multi-employer unit. Despite this fact, the court 
stated that continuing membership in the larger unit "does noth-
ing to negate" the presumption of majority status within the 
single employer unit.37 
The third presumption relied upon was that this 
"subsisting" presumption was revived upon the employers' with-
drawal from the multi-employer unit.38 Specifically, it was trig-
gered when the employer who had timely withdrawn from the 
larger unit refused to bargain with the incumbent union on a 
single employer basis. 
These three presumptions, coupled with the policy of main-
taining stability in established bargaining relationships, led the 
court to conclude that the presumption of continuing majority 
status had survived the employers' timely withdrawal from the 
multi-employer unit. 
Direct-Derivative Analysis 
In his dissent to the Board's Tahoe Nugget decision, Member 
Walther argued that the presumption of continuing majority sta-
tus should not be applied to a single-employer unit after with-
drawal from a multi-employer unit because of the distinctions 
34. 584 F.2d at 303. 
35. [d. 
36. C. MORRIS, supra note 28, at 240; Sheridan Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503 
(1964), enforced, 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966); Mor Paskesz, 171 N.L.R.B. 116 (1968), 
enforced, 405 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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between presumptions applicable to single-employer and to 
multi-employer units. 3D Under his analysis, the critical factor, 
ignored by the Board and subsequently by the Ninth Circuit, is 
that the relevant majority for determining a union's status as the 
exclusive bargaining representative in a multi-employer unit "is 
the majority of employees within the entire multi-employer 
unit."40 Consequently, a majority of the employees of a single-
employer unit need not be in favor of the bargaining representa-
tive of the multi-employer unit. In fact, once an employer joins a 
multi-employer unit it does not violate the law by continuing to 
bargain with a union which does not have majority status among 
its own employees. As a result, "the presumption of continued 
majority in a multi-employer situation provides no basis in fact 
or in law for a presumption of majority in the single-employer 
unit, since the former presumption exists regardless of, or even 
contrary to, actual majority status on a single-employer basis."41 
He concluded that since presumptions are "essentially legal fic-
tions," they should not be employed where "they fail utterly to 
mirror reality (as when the probability of the fact presumed to be 
in existence diminishes to nothingness) . . . . "42 
The Ninth Circuit responded to this analysis by stating that 
the presumption of continued majority in a single-employer unit 
after an employer withdraws from a multi-employer unit is not 
based upon majority status within the multi-employer unit. On 
the contrary, it is directly inferrable from the employer's previous 
action in joining the multi-employer association. This conduct by 
the employer created a presumption that majority status existed 
within the single-employer unit at the time the employer joined 
the multi-employer unit. Because membership in the larger unit 
does nothing to erode this presumption, withdrawal merely en-
tails a return to the status quo ante. 43 By asserting that the em-
ployer's own initial conduct is the basis for the "continued major-
ity" presumption, the court precluded the employer from arguing 
that majority status never existed within the single-employer unit 
at the time the employer joined the association. This argument 
was previously rejected by the Board, relying on the rule that one 
may not defend against a refusal to bargain charge on the ground 
39. Tahoe Nugget, 227 N .L.R.B. at 358·59. 
40. [d. at 359. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. 584 F.2d at 302-03. 
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that the initial recognition was unlawful, when recognition oc-
curred more than six months before the charges were filed. 44 
In rejecting the Walther analysis, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished several cases which have held that the continuing major-
ity presumption does not survive the dissolution of a multi-
employer unit. These cases were distinguished on the grounds 
that they did not involve an employer's voluntary recognition but 
rather were based upon Board-certified elections within the entire 
multi-employer units. Because an election within a multi-
~mployer unit does not prove that the union ever had majority 
support of the employees within any single-employer unit, the 
employer had reasonable grounds to doubt the union's majority 
status,4s 
Although the primary reason for applying the presumption 
following withdrawal from a multi-employer unit is the mainte-
nance of stability in establishe<;l bargaining relationships, the 
Ninth Circuit's holding does not consistently effectuate that pol-
icy. The practical result of the Court's analysis is that the pre-
sumption will apply when an employer withdraws from a multi-
employer association which voluntarily recognized its bargaining 
representative, but will not apply when an employer withdraws 
from a mUlti-employer association which recognized its bargain-
44. Tahoe Nugget, 227 N.L.R.B. at 363-64. 
45. Two Sixth Circuit opinions which applied the "derivative" analysis and thus 
refused to extend the presumption, evolved out of the same factual circumstances. In 
NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1964) and NLRB v. Richard 
W. Kaase Co., 346 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965), employers who had previously recognized the 
Bakery and Confectionary Workers union (BCW) joined a multi-employer association 
which voted to recognize the American Bakery and Confectionary Workers union (ABC). 
After ABC's certification year had expired. the successor employer in Downtown refused 
to bargain with ABC and voluntarily recognized HeW on the basis of authorization cards. 
Although the court found Downtown to be a succe880r employer subject to the presump-
tion of continuing majority status. it accepted the employer's argument that a reasonable 
doubt was proved. The basis for the reasonable doubt W8B the fact that a Board election 
for ABC within the multi-employer unit did not prove that this employer's employees 
supported ABC. The court concluded that the dissolution of the multi-employer unit of 
which the predecessor employer's employees composed a relatively small segment served 
as a reasonable ground for the belief that the union had lost its majority status among 
those employees. 
In Kaase, the employer recognized BCW after termination of the existing agreement 
with ABC. Again, the court refused to enforce the bargaining order. It distinguished the 
general rule that there is a rebuttable presumption of majority status after a certification 
year has expired by noting that "the ambiguity inherent in the multi-employer election 
relied on vitiates its efficacy to prove a majority as to any single employer. Before continu-
ance of the fact of majority can be presumed, the original existence of that fact must be 
established." 346 F.2d at 31. 
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ing representative after a Board-certified election within the 
multi-employer unit.4ft 
D. REBUTIING THE PRESUMPTION OF MAJORITY SUPPORT 
One year after union certification or recognition,47 an em-
ployer may rebut the presumption by showing either: (1) that the 
Union, in fact, had no majority on the date of the refusal to 
bargain or (2) that the employer had a good faith, reasonable 
doubt about the union's continuing majority status.4S The first 
defense is essentially a "straightforward factual question"4D and 
was not considered by the court, which instead focused on the 
good faith doubt defense. 
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tahoe Nugget, there 
were no time limitations on the evidence employers could intro-
duce to substantiate their good faith doubts of a union's majority 
status. In Tahoe Nugget, however, the Ninth Circuit placed se-
vere time limitations on the evidence which can be introduced in 
defense of a refusal to bargain charge. The court held that section 
lO(b) of the Act,50 which states that "no complaint shall issue 
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six 
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board," functions 
as an evidentiary bar when employers attempt to substantiate 
their good faith doubt by offering evidence of knowledge of pre-
lO(b) unfair labor practices.51 In effect, the court held that the 
objective facts on which employers may base their good faith 
doubt are only those which have occurted within the six months 
immediately preceding the filing of a refusal to bargain charge.52 
46. Although this result seems likely· under the analysis employed by the court, the 
Ninth Circuit may apply the presumption in the context of withdrawal from a Board-
certified multi-employer unit. The court stated that the inference of majority status in a 
single-employer unit from a union's victory in a multi-employer election is "reasonable" 
despite the fact that other courts have deemed the inference to be too attenuated. 584 F.2d 
at 303. 
47. See notes 21 and 22 supra. 
48. NLRB v. Morse Shoe, Inc., 591 F.2d 542,546 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Vegas Vic, 
Inc., 546 F.2d 828,829 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977); Retired Persons 
Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1975); Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 
1482 (1965), enforcement denied on other grounds, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966). 
49. 584 F.2d at 298. 
50. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). 
51. 584 F.2d at 301. As used in this note, the term "pre-10(b) unfair labor practice" 
means an alleged unfair labor practice which occurred more than six months prior to the 
filing of the current unfair labor practice charges. 
52. A previous Ninth Circuit case held that evidence of an unfair labor practice which 
occurred beyond the 10(b) period could not be admitted in defense of a refusal to bargain 
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In reaching this decision, the court distinguished issues re-
quiring proof of subjective motivation from those of refusal to 
bargain. According to the Ninth Circuit, section lO(b) is not an 
evidentiary bar when a showing of subjective motivation is neces-
sary to disprove an unfair labor practice charge. But that section 
is an evidentiary bar in a refusal to bargain situation, however, 
since "[s]ubjective motivation is not ... an element of the 
reasonable doubt defense."53 The court stated that the Sixth Cir-
cuit had misperceived the good faith criterion when it held in 
NLRB v. Dayton Motels54 that section lO(b) does not act as an 
evidentiary bar where employers attempt to prove their good 
faith doubt of majority status. The Ninth Circuit stated that the 
focus of the good faith criterion is empirical and objective.55 Rely-
ing on the Supreme Court's de-emphasis on employer motivation 
in NLRB v. Gissel Packing CO.,S6 the court held that employers 
are free to act on the objective grounds before them, regardless 
of their subjective motivation, and that because a refusal to bar-
gain charge is unconcerned with subjective motivation, evidence 
of a pre-10(b) unfair labor practice is inadmissible.57 
Bryan Manufacturing and the Good Faith Defense 
The use of section lO(b) as an evidentiary bar originated in 
the Supreme Court's decision in Local Lodge #1424 v. NLRB 
(Bryan Manufacturing). 58 That case concerned the continued en-
forcement of a union security clause in ~ collective bargaining 
agreement which was executed more than six months previously, 
at a time when the union did not represent a majority of the 
employees covered by the agreement. The agreement contained 
both a recognition clause naming the union exclusive bargaining 
representative of all the employees and a union security clause 
requiring employees to become and remain union members.58 
Both sides agreed that section lO(b) barred charges relating spe-
cifically to the execution of the agreement. The Board contended 
charge, but that case dealt only with the "no majority in fact" defense. NLRB v. Trag-
niew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1972). As a result, the court in Tahoe Nugget was 
presented with an open question as to whether such evidence could be used to show that 
the employer entertained a good faith doubt of the union's majority. 
53. 584 F.2d at 301. 
54. 474 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1973). 
55. 584 F.2d at 299. 
56. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
57. 584 F .2d at 300-01. 
58. 362 U.S. 411 (1960). 
59. [d. at 412. 
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that the complaint was timely since it was based upon the parties 
continued enforcement, within the period of limitations, of the 
union security clause.8o Because enforcement of the clause was 
tainted only by the now time-barred unlawful recognition clause, 
the employers argued that to accept the position that section 
lO(b) is only a statute of limitations and not a rule of evidence 
would prevent the running of the statute of limitations in a case 
of this kind.81 
The Supreme Court accepted the employer's view and held 
the complaints barred by section 1O(b).82 Although section lO(b) 
does not prevent all use of evidence of events which transpired 
more than six months before the filing of a charge, due regard for 
the policies and purposes of lO(b) requires that two situations be 
distinguished: 
The first is one where occurrences within this six 
month limitations period in and of themselves 
constitute, as a substantive matter, unfair labor 
practices. There, earlier events are utilized to 
shed light on the true character of matters occur-
ring within the limitations period; and for that 
purpose section 10(b) ordinarily does not bar such 
evidentiary use of anterior events. The second sit-
uation is that where conduct occurring within the 
limitations period can be charged to be an unfair 
labor practice only through reliance on an earlier 
unfair labor practice. There the use of the earlier 
unfair labor practice is not merely "evidentiary," 
since it does not simply lay bare a putative cur-
rent unfair labor practice. Rather, it serves to 
cloak with illegality that which was otherwise law-
ful. And where a complaint based upon that ear-
lier event is time-barred, to permit the event itself 
60. 1d. at 415. This continuing enforcement violated Board principle, evolved under 
sections 7 and 8 of the Act, that it is an unfair labor practice for each party to enter into 
a collective bargaining agreement which contains a union security clause if the union did 
not represent a majority of unit employees when the agreement was executed. Maintaining 
the agreement in force was considered a continuing violation of the Act. The majority 
status of the union at any subsequent date was immaterial because it was presumed that 
subsequent acquisition of majority status was attributable to the earlier unlawful assis-
tance derived from the original agreement. The same doctrine applied to an agreement 
containing only a recognition clause. 1d. at 414·15. 
61. 1d. at 415-16. 
62. 1d. at 416. As a result of its holding, the enforcement, as distinguished from the 
execution of such an agreement, constitutes an actionable unfair labor practice for only 
six months following the making of the agreement. 1d. at 423. 
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to be so used in effect results in reviving a legally 
defunct unfair labor practice.83 
In analyzing whether the decision to bar the Employers' 
evidence in Tahoe Nugget was a correct interpretation of Bryan 
Manufacturing, the threshold question is whether the defense of 
the refusal to bargain charge was "inescapably grounded on 
events predating the limitations period."84 If it was so grounded, 
the evidence would have been excluded under the express lan-
guage of the Supreme Court; thus, the line drawn between subjec-
tive and non-subjective motivation-for determining when sec-
tion lO(b) functions as an evidentiary bar-would have been un-
necessary to the Ninth Circuit's decision. Although a showing of 
lack of majority status on the date of the Union's initial recogni-
tion, for the limited purpose of revealing the Employers' subse-
quent good faith doubt, would undermine the validity of the pre-
sumptions employed, the defense was not "inescapably 
grounded" on pre-lO(b) events. The majority support needed to 
prove a refusal to bargain violation is that existing on the refusal 
to bargain date.65 Had the pre-10(b) evidence been admitted, 
then, the Employers would have to show objective facts of reason-
able doubt of majority status on the refusal to bargain date.ee 
A further question is whether the line drawn in Tahoe Nug-
get comports with the two situations distinguished in Bryan 
Manufacturing. The Bryan Court stated that reference to pre-
lO(b) unfair labor practices was ordinarily permissible to "shed 
light" on the character of matters occurring within the limita-
tions periodY The Tahoe Nugget court, on the other hand, said 
it is permissible to shed light only where motivation is at issue.68 
This analysis, however, precludes the use of evidence which the 
Supreme Court would arguably have allowed. Even where an 
63. [d. at 416·17 (footnote omitted). 
64. The Court expressed no view on the problem raised by cases which have held § 
10(b) a bar in circumstances where the evidence marshalled from within the six month 
period is not substantial, and the merit of the allegation in the complaint is shown largely 
by reliance on the earlier events, other than to say that a violation which is "inescapably 
grounded on events predating the limitations period is directly at odds with the purposes 
of the § lO(b) proviso." [d. at 421·22. 
65. 584 F.2d at 297. 
66. Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978). 
67. 362 U.S. at 416. Presumably, "ordinarily" permissible refers to situations such 
as the one the court specifically did not address, i.e., where a court refuses to "shed light" 
by admitting substantial evidence of pre.10(b) events in a case where there is insubstan· 
tial evidence within the 10(b) period. 
68. 584 F.2d at 301. 
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employer's motivation is not at issue, pre-lO(b) events can be a 
valuable tool for revealing the "true character of matters occur-
ring within the limitations period .... "69 One example would 
be where employees file a valid decertification petition seven 
months prior to a union's refusal to bargain charge against the 
employer. Under Bryan Manufacturing, evidence of the em-
ployer's knowledge of the decertification petition would have 
been permitted to show the employer's good faith doubt of the 
union's continuing majority statldS. However, under Tahoe 
Nugget, it would not be permitted. 
Because of the confusion and conflicts resulting from the 
court's rigid adherence to the two situations distinguished in 
Bryan Manufacturing, one commentator has suggested that sec-
tion lO(b) be used as an evidentiary bar only after a full consider-
ation of whether its use would be consistent with lO(b),s underly-
ing policies.70 These policies are first, preventing stale claims by 
barring litigation over past events "after records have been de-
stroyed, witnesses have gone elsewhere, and recollections of the 
events in question have become dim and confused", 71 and second, 
preserving stability in existing bargaining relationships.72 
The effectiveness of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tahoe 
Nugget in implementing those policies is illustrated by an analy-
sis of the case history of Dayton Motels, the Sixth Circuit case 
criticized by the Court for misperceiving the good faith criterion. 
In Dayton, the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's 
bargaining order and remanded the case to receive evidence on 
the circumstances surrounding the procurement of union authori-
zation cards three years earlier and to consider that evidence on 
the issue of the employer's good faith defense. 73 The court con-
cluded that the employer's defense was not dependent on the 
time-barred unfair labor practice. The court held that pre-lO(b) 
69. Local Lodge # 1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg.), 362 U.S. at 416. 
70. Note, The Labor Statute of Limitations: The Bryan Manufacturing Co. Case 
Revisited, 55 B.U. L. REv. 598, 620 (1975). 
71. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1947) (Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947). 
72. Local Lodge # 1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg), 362 U.S. at 419. "[Tlhe legislative 
history contains affirmative evidence that Congress was specifically advertent to the prob-
lem of agreements with minority unions, had previously been at pains to protect such 
agreements from belated attack, and manifested an intention, in enacting § lO(b), not to 
withdraw that protection." [d. at 426 . 
. 73. NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 335 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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events are admissible as background evidence reflecting on the 
mental attitude or good faith doubt of the company officials that 
the union ever represented a majority of employees. It further 
stated that "[i]n no way does this constitute an attack on the 
validity of the expiring agreement or on the presumption created 
thereby, which attack was barred by Section lO(b) of the Act."74 
Following remand, the Board took additional testimony but did 
not modify its original conclusion that the employer had refused 
to bargain. 75 
On application for enforcement, the Sixth Circuit held that 
there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the 
Board that, although the union's original majority status had 
been tainted by the pro-union activities of a female supervisor, 
that conduct did not enter into the employer's subsequent deci-
sion to withdraw recognition from the union and to refuse to 
bargain.78 The dissent argued that the union had received sub-
stantial assistance from a supervisor in its solicitation of member-
ship, that it therefore never had a bona fide majority status and 
that it "ought not to be representing the companyls employees."77 
Considering the "stale claims" policies of section lO(b), the 
reopening of the Dayton record for consideration of events of more 
than three years ago was likely plagued by missing witnesses and 
the confused recollections which Congress considered in enacting 
section lO(b). Furthermore, as revealed by the Dayton dissent, a 
consideration of evidence of an employer's subjective state of 
mind has great potential for disrupting the industrial stability 
that was to be secured by foreclosing attack on the majority sta-
tus of a union six months after its initial recognition.7s To open 
that status to allow proof of an employer's "good faith" in refus-
ing to bargain could result indirectly in that which the Act di-
rectly prohibits. Viewed against this background, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Tahoe Nugget opinion effectuates the policies of section 
lO(b) more fully than does the Sixth Circuit in Dayton. 
74. [d. at 333. 
75. NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 525 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1975). 
76. [d. at 477. 
77. [d. 
78. "The debates show that the issue of representation by minority unions was in the 
forefront of legislative concern." Bryan Mfg., 362 U.S. at 426 n.16. 
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E. PRACTICAL EFFECT 
The line drawn in Tahoe Nugget for the use of section lO(b) 
as an evidentiary bar is a reasonable one in cases in which proof 
of motivation is necessary. It presents problems, however, for the 
employer who refuses to bargain and then defends on the basis 
of a good faith doubt in the union's continuing majority status. 
The good faith doubt defense originally depended largely on the 
employer's subjective motivation, so that the true majority status 
of the union on the refusal to bargain date was irrelevant.79 Subse-
quent cases place much greater emphasis on the need for objec-
tive facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of that status.so 
The employer must show "by clear, cogent, and convincing"81 
evidence that there is sufficient reliable evidence to case a serious 
doubt on the union's majority status. Good faith is now shown by 
the employer's knowledge, at the time of the refusal, of sufficient 
objective facts to raise a reasonable doubt, but excluding knowl-
edge of facts which occurred more than six months prior to the 
filing of the charge. In addition, the refusal must have occurred 
in a context otherwise free of employer unfair labor practices.82 
79. In Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), rev 'd. on other grounds, 
139 NLRB 966, 968 (1962), the Board stated that whether an employer violates § 8(a)(5) 
depends not on whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut the continuing majority 
presumption or to demonstrate that the union in fact did not represent the majority of 
employees, but rather depends upon whether the employer in good faith believed that the 
union no longer represented the majority of the employees. Prerequisites to a finding of 
good faith were that there must have been "some reasonable grounds" and the issue of 
majority status must not have arisen in a context of illegal anti-union activities. 95 
N.L.R.B. at 673. The dissent stated that although the Board asserted that a presumption 
of continuing majority status existed, in using the subjective good faith standard, it 
ignored the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut that presumption. 
[d. at 675. 
80. The shift from a subjective good faith doubt standard to greater reliance on 
objective evidence of majority status has been attributed to the difficulty of proving an 
employer's subjective state of mind. Seger, supra note 18, at 984. In Komatz Constr., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 317, 326 (8th Cir. 1972), the court stated that "[iln view of the demise 
in Gissel Packing of the subjective test of an employer's good faith doubt ... , the proper 
test for rebuttal of the presumption is whether there is objective evidence sufficient to 
warrant a good faith doubt of the union's majority .... " See also NLRB v. Vegas Vic, 
Inc., 546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1978); NLRB v. Windham 
Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1978); Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 
N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enforcement denied on other grounds, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 
1966). 
81. Pioneer Inn v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 839; Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 
519 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1975). 
82. Good faith is only demonstrated where "employer misconduct did not contribute 
to the loss of support." 584 F .2d at 300. 
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In view of the high quantum of evidence needed to rebut the 
presumption, the practical effect of the court's extension of the 
Bryan Manufacturing rule is to severely limit the good faith de-
fense. Where the facts relied upon by the employer are equivo-
cal-Le., not clearly referable to a decline in union support-no 
single factor will be sufficient to sustain the defense.83 Although 
the cumulative force of the evidence will be weighed against the 
force of the presumption,84 the court did not consider the evidence 
presented in Tahoe Nugget to have sufficient cumulative impact 
to override the presumption.85 
Thus the Board and the court in deference to the Board, 
place a high burden of proof88 on the party seeking to disrupt an 
established bargaining relationship. 
This, of course, is consistent with the philosophy 
of American labor law of promoting industrial 
peace through the collective bargaining process. 
Moreover, the imposition of a high burden of proof 
on the party seeking to overcome the presumption 
of majority accorded to an incumbent union is a 
recognition of the principle that a status shown to 
exist is presumed to continue until shown to have 
ceasedY 
In view of the fact that majority status in Tahoe Nugget was 
83. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d at 305. 
84. Pioneer Inn v. NLRB, 578 F.2d at 840. 
85. The following evidence was found to have insufficient cumulative impact to over-
ride the presumption: 1) reports of employee discontent which did not amount to a repu-
diation of the union, especially in the absence of a decertification petition; 2) high turn-
over, which is generally considered "insufficient to justify a refusal to bargain except when 
caused by employee discontent with the union" as a result of the Board's "presumption 
that new employees support the union in the same ratio as their predecessors ... "; 3) 
union inactivity which is an objective ground on which the employer may rely but which 
was found to be de minimis; 4) low union membership in the Tahoe area which was 
considered to be only marginally relevant because it was never tied to respondent's em-
ployees and, in addition, employees may favor union representation but choose not to join, 
especially in a right-to-work state; 5) financial difficulties of the union which the court 
stated were irrelevant to the issue of union support; 6) prior amicable relations between 
the parties; 7) admissions by the employer's attorney which related only to credibility and 
were found to be insignificant here. 584 F.2d at 304-08. 
86. The "clear, cogent and convincing" criteria is directed primarily at the type of 
evidence relied upon; the standard of proof is unchanged, to wit: whether there is suffi-
cient reliable evidence to cast serious doubt on union's mnjority." 584 F.2d at 297. The 
court also said that placing the burden on the employer is fair because the employer 
assumed the self-appointed role of vicarious champion of employee rights. [d. at 301. 
87. Morales, Presumption of Union's Majority Status in NLRB Cases, 29 LAB.L. J. 
309, 315 (1978). 
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never shown to have existed, but rather was presumed to exist 
from the beginning, the application of this principle in this con-
text is questionable. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Tahoe Nugget has been followed in a series 
of cases arising out of the same factual context: the withdrawal 
of individual employers from The Reno Employers Council fol-
lowed by their refusal to bargain with the incumbent union.88 
The thrust of the Ninth Circuit's decision is to force employers 
to continue to bargain with incumbent unions after they with-
draw from multi-employer units and to place the responsibility 
for asserting employee freedom of choice on the employees. Al-
though the employers in Tahoe Nuggett argued that the applica-
tion of the presumption of continuing majority status to a single 
employer after withdrawal of a multi-employer unit is destructive 
of the freedom of choice accorded employees in the selection of 
their bargaining representatives, it is not employee freedom of 
choice which is abridged by the court's decision. On the contrary, 
what the court is regulating is the ability of emplo~rs to vicari-
ously assert their employees' rights. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that allowing employers to rely on their employees rights 
in refusing to bargain is inimical to achieving industrial peace.SD 
When employers refuse to engage in collective bargaining in de-
fense of their employees rights, the balance between industrial 
stability and employee freedom of choice is weighed differently 
than when employees themselves assert their rights and demand 
decertification. DO 
Employers are still free to petition the Board for an election 
after they withdraw from a multi-employer unit. DI It is fairly 
88. NLRB v. Carda Hotels, Inc., 604 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Sierra Dev. 
Co., 604 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979); Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2837 (1979); Ponderosa Hotel and Casino, Inc., 233 N .L.R.B. 
92 (1978); Nevada Club, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1977); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 
N.L.R.B. 275 (1977); Barney's Club, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 414 (1976). 
89. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954). 
90. Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1975). 
91. The Board has applied essentially the same criteria, however, to determine 
whether there is a "question concerning representation affecting commerce" where an 
employer files an election petition under section 9(c)(1)(B) of the Act as it does to deter-
mine whether the "objective considerations" claimed by the employer are sufficient to 
support a good faith doubt defense in a refusal to bargain case. Morales, supra note 87, 
at 310. 
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clear, however, that absent unequivocal evidence ofloss of major-
ity support, employers must continue to bargain until the Board 
determines whether or not a question concerning representation 
exists. Because the Board generally "stays" election petitions 
pending resolution of unfair labor practice charges, once the 
union files a refusal to bargain charge, the employer will be con-
fronted with the presumption and the necessity of producing suf-
ficient timely and objective facts to rebut that presumption. 
Lyn Woollard 
V. , COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND THE 
DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Boeing Company v. National Labor Relations Board, I the 
Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB or the Board) order directing Boeing Com-
pany (the Employer) to abide by the terms of a contract that 
granted recognition to a craft union of welders, Local 286-W, 
International Union of Operating Engineers (the Union).2 The 
NLRB found a breach of the contract and therefore, a violation 
of section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA 
or the Act).3 Since 8(d) violations routinely imply violations ofthe 
1. 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. Sept. 1978) (per Kunzig, D.J., sitting by designation; the 
other panel members were Duniway and Wright, JJ.). 
2. The Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977). 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1970), which states in part: 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the 
performance of mutual obligation of the employer and the rep-
resentative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith . . . 
Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining 
contract . . . the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean 
that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such 
contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modifi-
cation -
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the con-
tract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days 
prior to the expiration date thereof, . . . 
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the pur-
pose of negotiating a new contract . . . 
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
... and 
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to 
strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing 
contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or 
72
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/13
1980] LABOR LAW 431 
employer's duty to bargain in good faith, the Board deemed sec-
tion 8(a)(5)4 of the Act violated also. The NLRB determined that 
the recognition clause of the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment (CBA) placed the function "tack welding" within the 
Union's jurisdiction and the Employer violated its duty to bar-
gain in good faith when it transferred that function to- another 
bargaining unit. The Board's order directed the Employer to 
cease and desist5 from this practice during the life of the agree-
ment.a The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the order, holding 
that since tack welding was not a term expressly contained in the 
contract, the Employer was free to transfer the work out of the 
Union's bargaining unit as long as it: 1) bargains in good faith to 
impasse over the decision, and 2) has no improper motive in 
taking its action.7 
This holding seems to merely reiterate well settled law that 
decisions by employers in areas traditionally designated as man-
agement prerogative are subject to bargaining only insofar as they 
impact on wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment.8 However, implicit in the court's reasoning is the require-
ment of an explicit itemization in the CBA of every function 
normally alloted to a specific bargaining unit before work trans-
fers can be found prohibited under section 8(d), no matter how 
explicit the parties' bargaining history on the issue. This denigra-
tion of the NLRB's expertise in labor relations and the potential 
destabilization of collective bargaining relationships may have a 
widespread effect on labor relations in unclear areas of manage-
ment prerogative and union representation of its membership. 
until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs 
later .... 
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1970) which states: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (5) to refuse 
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees 
Since both 8(d) and 8(a)(5) deal with the duty to bargain in good faith, an employer's 
violation of one is generally a violation of the other. See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVEL· 
OPING LABOR LAW, Ch. 11 (1971, Cum. Supp. 1971·75, Supp. 1976, Supp. Hin). 
5. The authority for Board cease and desist orders may be found in § 10(c) of the Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). 
6. 230 N.L.R.B. at 705. 
7. 581 F.2d at 797. 
8. See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at ch. 15. 
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B. FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED 
In 1959, the NLRB carved out a craft unit of welders from a 
larger bargaining unit then employed at Boeing and represented 
by the International Association of Machinists (lAM), ruling that 
the welders were more appropriately represented in a craft unit 
and had a similarity of skills that were substantially different 
from the other members of the bargaining unit.9 Based on func-
tional criteria, the Board twice modified the jurisdictional grant 
to the Union through the procedure of petitioning to clarify the 
unit. lo Certain functions were determined to be welding and as-
signed to the Union; others were not considered welding and were, 
therefore, assigned to the larger unit represented by lAM. Each 
modification was adopted pro forma as the new recognition clause 
in the next CBA. II 
In 1977, despite the previous bargaining history, the Em-
9. Boeing Airplane Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 689 (1959). In 1939, the Board determined that 
craft units would not be carved out of broad industrial units (as here) unless the industrial 
union failed to show that it adequately represented the crafts' interests and the past 
bargaining history showed successful representation of the broad unit. American Can Co., 
13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939). In response, Congress added section 9(b)(2) to the then National 
Labor Relations Act (now Labor Management Relations Act) stating: 
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to 
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights 
guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the 
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, 
craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof: Provided That the 
Board shall not. . . (2) decide that any craft unit is inappro-
priate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has 
been established by a prior Board determination, unless a ma-
jority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against 
separate representation . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2)(1970). 
In 1954, just prior to the creation of this welders' unit the Board interpreted section 
9(b)(2) to grant free severance to craft units. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 107 
N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954). See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at ch. 9 (1971); J. ABODEELY, THE 
NLRB AND THE ApPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 87-92 (1976) (Labor Relations and Public 
Policy Series, Rep. No.3, U. Pa.). 
10. 230 N.L.R.B. at 698 n.7. Clarification is provided for by § 10(d), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(d), where the Board is authorized to modify or set aside any finding or order not 
made final. NLRB determinations of representation proceedings (29 U.S.C. § 159 et seq.) 
are not considered final orders within § 160 of the Act. Under rule 102.60(b) of the Board's 
Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1017 (1969), "[a] petition for clarification of an 
existing bargaining unit or petition for amendment of certification may be filed by a labor 
organization or by an employer." 
11. "[F]rom 'February 20, 1959, to date, the applicable recognition clause in the 
[union's] (or its predecessor's) contracts with [the Company] were identical to the 
bargaining unit's description as found in the most recent NLRB certification.''' 230 
N .L.R.B. at 698. 
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ployer decided that tack welding could be unilaterally reassigned 
and no unit clarification procedure would be necessary. Since the 
Union felt that tack welding was covered by the recognition 
clause and within its exclusive jurisdiction, it filed an unfair labor 
practice l2 charge with the NLRB charging unlawful erosion of its 
bargaining unit. Hence, this disagreement over the Union's juris-
diction arose in the arena of an unfair labor practice hearing 
rather than a unit clarification hearing. 13 In deciding whether or 
not tack welding was protected by the agreement, the Board 
adopted the reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
who determined that the bargaining history between the. parties 
placed the tack welding function within the recognition clause of 
the contract. By transferring the work from the unit without the 
Union's consent, the Employer violated section 8(d) and deriva-
tively sections 8(a)(1) and (5). 14 The ALJ determined that tack 
welding was within the terms of the contract's recognition clause l5 
by looking at the past bargaining history between the parties: the 
parties had previously interpreted that recognition clause by de-
12. [d. at 696. 
13. See note 10 supra. Since unit clarification proceedings are not final orders under 
29 u.s.c. § 160, they are not generally reviewable by the courts except as incidental to 
unfair labor practices contained in 29 u.s.c. § 158. Hence, one possible defense to the 
Board's decision in Boeing was that tack welding is not an appropriate function of the craft 
unit. The Boeing Court does not address this issue. See J. ABODEELY, supra note 9, at 114-
19. 
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1970) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights 
guaranteed in section 157 of this titlll." For the text of § 158(a)(5) see note 4 supra. 
15. The recognition clause in the collective bargaining agreement describing the 
"unit covered" in this bargaining unit between the union and the employer states: 
All welders, including research, high strength, production, 
burner, gas and arc, maintenance A and maintenance B weld-
ers, welder leadmen, burners' apprentices and helpers, and in-
cluding all employees operating machine welding equipment 
where, in the operation thereof and in the process of the weld, 
based on the employees' sight or sound observations, the equip-
ment may require adjustment in variables such as travel speed, 
arc voltage, arc gap, current, amount of filler metal being fed 
into welding puddle, seam tracking or adjustment for varia-
tions in the thickness of material, mismatch or gap, in order to 
produce a satisfactory weld, employed by the Employer at its 
plant and operations located in the state of Washington, ex-
cluding automatic fusion welding machine operators, sheet 
metal worker and welder maintenance C employees, employees 
operating the Airco gas tungsten arc welding machine at the 
Employer's Auburn, Washington, plant, office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, guards, all other employees, and 
supervisors are defined in the Act. 
230 N.L.R.B. at 698 n.8. 
75
Robinson et al.: Labor Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
434 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:359 
ferring to the NLRB's unit clarification procedure. Thus, he as-
serted that had the Board conducted unit clarificationl6 involving 
tack welding, it would have properly determined that the func-
tion was more appropriate to a craft unit of welders than in the 
larger unit of machinists. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded: 
Therefore, the nature of the unit, the history 
of its evolution, and the parties' practice of assign-
ing welding, including tack welding, pursuant 
thereto support the contention that the contrac-
tural unit did implicitly embody tack welding as 
one of the job functions to which employees repre-
sented by the Union were entitled. 17 
Despite the Board's reliance on the ALJ's conclusions, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the Board, holding that the recognition 
clause could not legally be extended to cover functions, reserving 
that clause to a description of the people who were included in 
the unit. IS Therefore, assigning tack welding exclusively to Union 
members could not be read as a term of the contract. Since the 
function was not explicitly protected by the collective bargaining 
agreement, there was no violation of section 8(d). Since there was 
a stipulation that the Employer had fulfilled all other bargaining 
duties,19 there was no showing of bad faith bargaining by not 
discussing the Employer's decision to transfer this work. There-
fore, the 8(a)(1) and (5) violations, which were based on bad faith 
bargaining, must also fail. 
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning raises two important issues 
regarding the role of the NLRB in contract administration. First, 
when the NLRB creates a unit based on functional criteria, can 
16. Board Unit determination is generally based on the following rationale: .. [Tlhe 
Board's primary concern is to group together only employees who have substantial mutual 
interests in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment." 15 NLRB ANN. REp. 139 
(1950). See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 217. The major criteria in determining a severance 
of a smaller group is at group's community of interest. Kennecott Corp., 176 N .L.R.B. 96 
(1969); Kalamazoo Paper Box COI;p., 136 N .L.R.B. 134 (1962). If that smaller group claims 
to be a craft unit, then the community of interest focuses on the skill and function of the 
persons in the unit. Beaunit Mills, Inc., 109 N·.L.R.B. 651 (1954); Note, Labor Law-Labor. 
Management Relation Act-Section 9b(2)-Requirements for Severance of Craft Work-
ers-Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 988, 944 (1966-67). 
17. 230 N.L.R.B. at 700. 
18. 581 F.2d at 797. 
19. "As all parties agree that ... [the Employerl satisfied any bargaining obliga-
tion owed the Union absent the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, the obvious 
threshold question is whether it may be found that the current agreement embodies tack 
welding in the contractual unit." 230 N .L.R.B. at 698. 
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erosion of that unit be halted, and if so, how? Second, what is the 
role of the NLRB in resolving the dispute? Regarding the first 
issue, the Ninth Circuit is implicitly saying that the only way for 
a bargaining unit to remain intact during the life of a CBA is for 
the parties to write in explicit descriptions of every function that 
the union represents. Regarding the second issue, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has asserted its predominent role in contract interpretation, 
relegating the NLRB to the enforcement of clear and unambi-
guous terms and conditions and refusing to recognize Board ex-
pertise in the area of bargaining history interpretation. 
C. JURISDICTION OVER FUNCTIONS VERSUS RECOGNITION OF 
PERSONS 
In creating Boeing's craft unit of welders in 1959, the NLRB 
relied on normal indices of craft units, based on functional cri-
teria: the employees involved "perform skilled work, subject to 
rigid inspection, and require a long period of on-the-job training 
and experience," thus qualifying as a "true craft" group.20 Twice 
the Board modified the craft unit here, once in 1966 on a petition 
by the Employer and once in 1974 by request from the Union.21 
In determining whether certain classifications of employees 
should be added, the Board used the test outlined in 
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. 22 There the Board itemized six 
factors for determining when it could appropriately create craft 
units from larger units, including: 
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of 
a distinct and homogenous group of skilled jour-
neymen craftsmen performing the functions of 
their craft on a non-repetitive basis, or of employ-
ees constituting a functionally distinct depart-
ment. 
4. The history and pattern of collective bargain-
ing in the industry involved. 
5. The degree of integration of the employer's 
production processes, including the extent to 
which the continued normal operation of the pro-
duction processes is dependent upon the perform-
20. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422 (1954). 
21. See note 9 supra. 
22. 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966). See also Holmberg, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 407 (1966); E. 1. 
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 413 (1966); C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at Ch. 9, 
225-31; J. ABODEELY, supra note 9, at 94-106. 
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ance of the assigned functions of the employees in 139 
the proposed unit.23 
Though the process of unit clarification differs from a determina-
tion of craft status in substantial procedural ways,24 the use of the 
Mallinckrodt criteria is substantively appropriate since the sub-
stantive issues are identical. "Consequently, since 195~, the bar-
gaining unit has remained a craft unit, the scope and composition 
of which has been governed under Board principles concerning 
such craft units. "25 Following each unit clarification the Em-
ployer and the Union have, apparently without discussion, con-
formed their recognition clause, to the Board's conception of the 
craft unit which was based largely on functional criteria.28 
However, the Ninth Circuit, focusing on the lack of bargain-
ing over the recognition clause, objected to the Board applying its 
job function analysis to a clause which normally identifies the 
people subject to the terms of the contract. Rather,' the court 
urges that to properly protect the functions in a bargaining unit, 
the parties must negotiate a "jurisdictional clause." Such clause 
must, as far as possible, identify all of the possible functions that 
areto be represented by the Union. "Rather than stretching the 
meaning of a Recognitional Clause 'impliedly,' (implicitly' or 'in 
effect' to cover 'functions' (as did the Board), a decision against 
the Board would encourage the parties affirmatively to negotiate 
an explicit 'Jurisdictional Clause' to be included in the next 
CBA."27 
23. 162 N.L.R.B. at 397 (emphasis added). 
24. In a unit clarification, the procedure involved is much more abbreviated as the 
relevant issues are proper classification of a particular job and/or accretions to bargaining 
units. Rather than a full scale investigation into all community interests, bargaining 
history and perhaps elections, the ALl makes a determination on a single fUnction. For a 
discussion of the job classification issue, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 142 N .L.R.B. 317 
(1963); Boston Gas Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 219 (1962). For a discussion of the accretion issue, 
see Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 173 NLRB 310 (1968); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 173 
N.L.R.B. 319 (1968). For a discussion of the determination of an appropriate unit, see 
NLRB's Statement of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.17-21 (1979). 
25. 230 N.L.R.B. at 698. 
26.1d. 
27. 581 F.2d at 798. This "encouragement" was specifically addressed by the Board 
and rejected as unworkable. 
It is, of course, true that the recognition clauses in the 
successive agreements in the instant case, as in University of 
Chicago, have not recited in detail all of the skills, functions, 
and duties which the employees encompassed thereby are to 
exercise and perform. Indeed, it was principally this omission 
which in that case led the Seventh Circuit to criticize the 
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The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion, University of Chicago v. NLRB,28 for the proposition that an 
explicit jurisdictional clause is desirable. However, the cases are 
distinguishable: first, the bargaining unit in the University of 
Chicago instance was not a craft unit, created on a functional 
basis; and second, the work that was transferred from the bar-
gaining unit in the University of Chicago instance was bargained 
over extensively and the impacts were clearly minimized.29 In 
University of Chicago, a decision against the Board was likely to 
encourage the parties to better protect their functional fiefdoms. 
In Boeing, however, because of the lack of bargaining, the craft 
unit founded on a functional basis, and the bargaining history of 
the parties establishing an intent to determine their recognition 
clause upon Board principles of craft units, the decision against 
the Board is only likely to inhibit parties whose contractual pro-
tection is eroded from seeking Board protection. 
D. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: THE NLRB OR THE COURTS 
Section 8(d) of the LMRA, which defines the duty to bargain, 
contains a proviso directed toward existing collective bargaining 
agreements that cover the area complained of by the union or 
Board's reasoning as a 'novel theory.' Yet, it is exceedingly rare 
to find either a collective-bargaining agreement or a certifica-
tion which does recite every detail of every duty of every classi-
fication encompassed therein. To attempt to do so would gener-
ate recognition clauses of tome proportions, particularly where 
a number of classifications were encompassed or where the unit 
covered, as in the instant case where 300 pages of transcript 
plus a number of exhibits have been devoted to explaining 
welding duties, craft employees. 
230 N.L.R.B. at 700. Perhaps what the Ninth Circuit wishes to encourage is the adoption 
of a catch-all phrase such as: "Jurisdiction: All functions presently performed by the 
above recognized union members are reserved to those union members." Since this would 
leave the Board in the same position as presented by the Boeing case, with the additional 
catch-all requiring the ALJ to interpret the recognition clause by functional criteria, little 
would seem accomplished by this phrase. 
28. 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975) (enforcement denied, University of Chicago, 210 
N.L.R.B. 190 (1974)). 
29. 514 F.2d at 946. Additionally, in University of Chicago. the Board found, similar 
to this case, the transfer of bargaining unit work functions to be specifically forbidden by 
the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 2lO N .L.R.B. 190, enforcement 
denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975). This decision was based upon an analysis of the 
bargaining history wherein the Board determined that the duties assigned to the bargain-
ing unit were an "inextricable, albeit inexplicit, part of the bargaining history." 210 
N .L.R.B. at 197. The Seventh Circuit viewed this past practice analysis of contractually 
established work assignments, as a "novel theory" and, therefore, denied enforcement. 514 
F.2d at 944. 
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employer.3o Neither party can alter or modify the terms of a con-
tract during its terms except in certain instances or with the other 
parties' consent. In both Boeing and University of Chicago, the 
issue was framed as whether the employer can transfer work from 
a bargaining unit covered by a CBA. The Board, in both instances 
found that the work was an integral part of the recognition clause 
and hence, a transfer of work without the other parties consent 
was contrary to the 8(d) proviso.3t In both instances, the circuits 
reversed the Board, finding that the work was not .protected by 
the recognition clauses: 
As we read the cases, unless transfers are specifi-
cally prohibited by the bargaining agreement, an 
employer is free to transfer work out of the bar-
gaining unit if: (1) the employer complies with 
... [the duty to bargain regarding transfers of 
work] by bargaining in good faith to impasse and 
(2) the employer is not motivated by anti-union 
animus, ... 32 
The Ninth Circuit, by adopting the language of the Seventh 
Circuit, clearly holds that the transfer of work from the bargain-
ing unit is a mandatory subject of bargaining, at least as far as 
the decision to transfer affects those mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. 
However, also implicit in this reasoning is the prohibition that 
the Board may not direct an employer to maintain such work in 
the bargaining unit during the term of a CBA unless that agree-
ment explicitly places the work in the bargaining unit. The effect 
of this logic is to further limit the NLRB's role in contract admin-
istration. 
30. See note 3 supra. 
31. 230 N .L.R.B. at 701. 
32. 581 F.2d at 797, quoting University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 949 (7th 
Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). The duty to bargain over the managerial decision stems 
from the well·known case, Fiberboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), in 
which a plurality of the Supreme Court held that when an employer subcontracts its 
business or a part thereof, in certain instances the employer must agree to bargain over 
the manner in which that decision affects wage, hours and working conditions of affected 
employees. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. The anti·union animus portion of 
the court's test derives from Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), 
where the Supreme Court held that an employer was free to close his business completely 
and reopen it elsewhere. Such a decision is not a mandatory subject of bargaining and is 
within a management's prerogative unless the decision is motivated solely by a desire to 
avoid union organizing at the former site and the implementation of that decision is 
subject to a request to bargain. 
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The relevant history of section 8(d) shows that it is closely 
tied with section 301 of the LMRN3 which allows private enforce-
ment of arbitration clauses in contracts and which defers to the 
contractually provided procedure for determining its scope.3• 
In 1971, the Board in Collyer Insulated Wire35 determined 
that when a contract contains grievance and/or arbitration mach-
inery that may cover the issues raised under the LMRA, the 
Board will defer to that machinery until it is exhausted or proven 
futile. 38 The Board will then have the discretion to review the 
settlement or decision. Section 301 of the LMRA allows private 
enforcement of the arbitration clauses of collective bargaining 
agreements, bypassing the Board's unfair practice proceedings. 
Now, in light of Boeing and University of Chicago and the circuit 
court's unwillingness to defer to Board expertise, the Board may 
find its authority in contract administration further impaired. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In Boeing, the Ninth Circuit held that as long as an employer 
bargains to impasse and does not act with improper movitation 
the decision to transfer work from a bargaining unit is not an 
improper contract modification violating either section 8(d), 
8(a)(1) or (8)(a)(5). Further, to stop employers from freely trans-
ferring bargaining unit work, a union must negotiate an explicit 
jurisdictional clause, since explicit recognitional clauses, no mat-
ter what their bargaining history, are relegated to the protection 
of bargaining unit members and not duties. Such a jurisdictional 
clause must specifically establish that the disputed work assign-
ment is a function reserved solely to the Union members. Further, 
the court will not allow the NLRB to enforce terms and conditions 
33. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1970). 
34. See C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at ch. 17. 
35. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). 
36. Id. at 843. Analagously, in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.5 (Deering Supp. 1979), the 
California Legislature expressly adopted the Collyer Insulated Wire doctrine and ordered 
that the Public Employee Relation Board (PERB) shall not have authority to enforce CBA 
agreements. Since PERB has found NLRB precedent persuasive guidance in interpreting 
its function, see CSEA v. San Mateo County Community College Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 
94 (jun. 8, 1979); Pajoraro Valley Unified Sch~l Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 51 (May 22, 
1978); Sweetwater Union High School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No.8 (Nov. 23, 1976), the 
impact of Boeing may be profound. Implying that it will only be an unfair labor practice 
if an express term of the contract is violated, Boeing may exclude bargaining history and 
other factors whenever the PERB is required to determine if a particular action by a public 
employer that is claimed to violate a CBA is also an unfair practice under CAL. GOV'T 
CODE § 3543.5 (Deering Supp. 1979). 
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contained in an agreement on the basis of an "implicit" provi. 
sion, identified by the Board's interpretation of bargaining his· 
tory. In other words, the Board may not use section 8(d) of the 
LMRA to enforce impliedly established jurisdictional clauses to 
contractually protect work assignments, even when that work 
assignment or function is clearly at the root of the recognition 
clause of the contract. 
Kevin S. Robinson 
VI. ILLEGAL ALIENS ARE EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO 
PROTECTION UNDER THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In NLRB u. Apollo Tire Co., Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit granted 
enforcement to a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the 
Board) order correcting unfair labor practices2 by the Apollo Tire 
Company (the Employer). The Board's order directed the em· 
ployer to cease and desist from threatening physical harm to 
employees who exercise their rights under the Labor Mangement 
Relations Act (LMRA, or the Act).3 It further ordered reinstate· 
ment with back pay of those employees who were discharged or 
laid off because of their exercise of these rights. In enforcing this 
order, the court specifically affirmed the NLRB's refusal to hear 
evidence that may have established that some of the employees 
laid off or threatened were illegal aliens" The Board determined, 
1. 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. Aug., 1979) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were 
Kennedy, J. and Hall, D.J.). 
2. The Board found violations of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l) and 158(a)(4)(1976). 
ld. 
Section 8 of the Act provides: 
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed in section 7 (29 U .S.C. § 157 of this 
title) . . . " 
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an em-
ployee because he has filed charges or given testimony under 
this Act; 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
thrOugh representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 
4. 604 F.2d at 1181. 
Illegal aliens are those aliens who would not be permitted to work in the United States 
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in accordance with its longstanding rule, that aliens are employ-
ees5 as defined by section 2(3)8 of the LMRA; therefore, even if 
the excluded evidence established the employees' unlawful sta-
tus, it would be irrelevant to a determination of the issues in-
volved. The Ninth Circuit agreed.7 
under pertinent federal laws. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE § 
2805(a)(West 1971); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 n.13 (1976); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 
U.S. 351, 353 n.2 (1976); NLRB v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1182. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 
583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978); Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 217 n.4 
(1976). 
5. The first mention of this longstanding rule appears in Logan & Paxton, 55 
N.L.R.B. 310 (1944), in dicta: 
While no direct issue was made at the hearings as to the inclu-
sion in the units of non-citizen employees and their eligibility 
to participate in the elections, it is evident from the record that 
such an issue may arise at the time of the elections. The Act 
does not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. In 
order to effectively carry out the purposes of the Act, we con-
clude that no distinction should be drawn on such a basis (Cf. 
Matter of U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1944) for the 
analogous proposition that the Act does not distinguish be-
tween black and white employees). Non-citizenship of an em-
ployee shall not, consequently, constitute a disqualification for 
participation in the election. 
1d. at 315, n.12. From this first mention of the rule and analysis of the purposes of the 
Act, the dicta became law. "[T]he Board has consistently held illegal aliens to be em-
ployees under the Act and entitled to its protection." Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 
215 (July, 1978), 1978 NLRB Dec. ~ 19,571 n.l, citing Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., Inc., 
227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976). See also Sure-Tan, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. (1971); Seidmon, Seid-
mon, Henkin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1953); Cities Servo Oil Co. of Penn., 87 
N .L.R.B. 324, 331 (1949) ("The eligibility of aliens to cast ballots is too well established 
to warrant justification anew here."); Azusa Citrus Ass'n, 65 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1138 (1946); 
Allen & Sandilands Packing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 725, 730 (1944). 
6. Section 2(3) of the LMRA reads: 
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not 
be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the 
Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual 
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection 
with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor 
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any 
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the do-
mestic service of any family or person at his home: or any 
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual 
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individ-
ual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by 
an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, (citation omit-
ted) as amended from time to time, or by any other person who 
is not an employer as herein defined. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1974). 
7. 604 F.2d at 1181. 
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The employer raised two defenses to the Board's order: (1) 
that the Board's longstanding rule conflicts with federal immigra-
tion laws, specifically the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA);8 and (2) by ordering the reinstatement of workers known 
to be here illegally, the Board is forcing the employer to violate 
state law, specifically section 2805(a) of the California Labor 
Code.' The first argument was rejected by the court since grant-
"ing employee status under the LMRA does not conflict with the 
INA and since the Board's interpretation of the LMRA best fur-
thers the policies of the immigration laws. 1o The second argument 
was rejected by the court on the grounds that the scope and 
meaning of the state statute is unclear and may be constitution-
ally infirm as conflicting with the federal superintendence of 
immigration and naturalization. Therefore, until the law is inter-
preted to be enforceable, the Board acted properly in treating 
illegal aliens identically with other employees in awarding back 
pay and reinstatement. II 
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Apollo Tire Co., Inc. is a business enterprise located in Can-
oga Park, California, employing approximately twenty-five em-
ployees, for many of whom English is not their first lan-
guage,,2 In early 1977, Mrs. Niz, whose husband and son were 
Apollo employees, complained to the general manager of the 
Employer about her son's unpaid overtime. Apollo's general man-
ager told her husband that if she complained to the Department 
of Labor about the wage dispute, the manager would have her 
killed. Subsequently, the woman went to the Department of 
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1952). 
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West 1971) provides: 
(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not 
entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employ· 
ment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers. 
(b) A person found guilty of a violation of subdivision (a) is 
punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) 
nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense. 
(c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action 
against the employer based upon violation of subdivision (a). 
10. 604 F.2d at 1183. This holding reflects the rationale of N.L.R.B. v. Sure·Tan, 
Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978) ...... [T)his certification and bargaining order are 
not inconsistent with federal immigration laws .... Thus by refusing to certify unions 
with a majority of alien members we would be giving employers an extra incentive to hire 
aliens and thus would be defeating the goals of the immigration laws." [d. at 359, 360. 
11. 604 F.2d at 1184. 
12. The court fully describes the facts. 604 F.2d at 1181·82. 
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Labor and obtained several complaint forms that she passed out 
to other employees. Seven employees filed complaints with the 
Department of Labor and six of the seven were laid off; four 
were not rehired. 13 Despite the employer's protestations of eco-
nomic necessity for layoffs, the trial examiner discounted this 
reason because of inconsistent testimony by the employer's wit-
nesses, the testimony of the Department of Labor compliance 
officer who stated that the general manager knew the identity of 
six of the seven complaining employees, and the testimony of all 
six employees that the general manager told them that they 
would not be rehired because of their complaints. If 
C. ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 
In upholding the NLRB's longstanding rule that aliens are 
employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the LMRA, 15 the 
Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether or not the 
Board should enforce LMRA policies that conflict with policies 
of other adminstrative agencies. Rather than find the Board's rule 
regarding aliens in conflict with federal immigration laws, the 
Apollo court stressed the underlying policy: "Were we to hold the 
[LMRA] inapplicable to illegal aliens, employers would be en-
couraged to hire such persons in hopes of circumventing the labor 
13. Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 215 (July, 1978) (advance sheet statement of 
facts). 
14. [d. 
15. See note 3 supra for the history of this rule. The Ninth Circuit defers to the 
NLRB's interpretation partially because in statutory construction great deference is given 
to the interpretation by the agency charged with its administration, Udall v. Tallman, 
380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965), and because that interpretation is so well established. "Because 
the Board's interpretation and application of the statute is well established, and has not 
been disturbed by Congress, we defer to its understanding of the statute unless it is clearly 
in error." N.L.R.B. v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1183 (citations omitted). 
However, Judge Wood's dissent to N.L.R.B. v. Sure-Tan, Inc., stated: "I am not 
persuaded in this instance by the argument that since the Board's interpretation is one 
of long standing it is therefore entitled to great weight .. I view it as only a case of the Board 
having been wrong for a long time." 583 F.2d at 362. See Comment, Labor Law-
Illegal Aliens Are Employees Under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) And May Vote in Union 
Certification Elections, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 747 (1979), which also criticizes this rule on 
two bases: First, that the origin of the rule is dicta, and second, that the court never 
explains how this policy of allowing illegal aliens to vote will effectuate the purposes of 
the Act. [d. at 748 n.9, 751 n.34. However, the purposes of the Act are clearly set forth by 
the broad definition of 2(3) of the Act. By listing exceptions to 2(3), Congress intended to 
grant protection to all workers except a distinct few classifications. Illegal aliens are not 
within those classes. When the Board does not apply this rule of interpretation to § 2(3), 
it subverts the policies of the Act. See N.L.R.B. v. Apollo Tire Co., Inc., 604 F.2d at 
1183; Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 254 (1976) (Member Fanning, 
dissenting) . 
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laws."18 By adopting the reasoning of the only other circuit to 
have dealt with the alien/employeel7 issue, the question of accom-
odation to other forums was sidestepped:s "We agree with the 
Sure-Tan majority that the Board's interpretation best furthers 
the policies underlying the immigation laws."19 
However, in NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc. the majority reserved 
comment on the possibility of back pay and reinstatement orders 
by the Board, expressing no opinion· as to whether or not such 
orders would conflict with the INA.20 The only issue before the 
Sure-Tan court was the validity of allowing aliens to vote in 
NLRB representation elections.21 The Ninth Circuit in Apollo 
implicitly approves the Board's extension of the Sure-Tan reason-
ing to back pay and reinstatement orders.22 
D. ILLEGAL ALIENS AND CALIFORNIA LAW 
California Labor Code section 2805 prohibits knowing em-
ployment of illegal aliens if such employment would adversely 
effect lawful resident workers and provides for fines against em-
ployers who violate its provisions.23 
16. 604 F.2d at 1183. 
17. N.L.R.B. v. Sure·Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978). 
18. The Sure-Tan majority specifically declined to adopt the position, hotly disputed 
in cases questioning the certification of racially discriminatory unions, "that the Board 
should not enforce policies administered by other government agencies." [d. at 359 (cita-
tions omitted). The court found it unnecessary to adopt this policy because the Board 
ordered no affirmative action on the part of the employer except to bargain with a duly 
certified union. It expressly left open the question of whether back pay orders would be 
appropriate for illegal aliens. In Sure Tan, Inc. (Sure-Tan 1I), 234 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978), 
the Board found that the illegal alien voters in Sure-Tan had been constructively dis-
charged by the employer when he or she reported their illegal status to the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. [d. at 1187. The Administrative Law Judge declined to order 
back pay and modified the normal back pay order because he found that the deported 
workers were unable to work. The Board rejected this part of the order and directed that 
a standard back pay and reinstatement order follow. [d. at 1188. The Board modified the 
trial examiner's proposed order in a similar fashion in Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., Inc., 
227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976) and Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 215 (July, 1978), aff'd, 
604 F.2d 11BO. 
19. [d. at 1183. 
20. 583 F.2d at 360 n.9. See also note 18 supra. 
21. In Sure-Tan, the employer refused to bargain with the union and the Board found 
a violation of the Act. The employer argued to the Seventh Circuit that six of the seven 
voters in the union's certification election were illegal aliens, therefore, the union had no 
majority status. The employer also reported his workers to the Immigration Service and 
five were deported (discussed in Sure-Tan 1I). See note 18 supra. 
22. 604 F.2d 1180 at 1183. 
23. For text of CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805, see note 9 supra. 
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In De Canas v. Bica,24 the Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed a California appellate court ruling that Labor Code section 
2805(a) unconstitutionally legislates in an area pre-empted by 
federal regulation.25 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, indi-
cated that states are not necessarily barred from regulating 
employment of illegal aliens. 28 The Apollo panel noted that the 
Supreme Court did not suggest that California was free to legis-
late in the area of immigration, rather it held that Congress had 
not expressly pre-empted the area. Thus, the California act is not 
per se unconstitutional.27 
Implicit in this analysis by the Supreme Court is the rule 
that the California legislature cannot act in conflict with the 
federal immigration policies and regulations. By applying the 
Seventh Circuit's Sure- Tan analysis to the back pay reinstate-
ment order, the Ninth Circuit, could by analogy have held that 
back pay with reinstatement also best furthers the underlying 
policies of Labor Code section 2805(a) .28 However, Apollo does not 
explicitly reach that conclusion; rather, it merely holds that as 
long as California law is unsettled and un interpreted in certain 
crucial sections, the Board acts properly when it treats aliens in 
24. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
25. 1d. at 354. 
26. Power Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably ex· 
clusively a federal power. . . . But the Court has never held 
that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens 
is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre·empted by 
this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised .... In 
this case, California has sought to strengthen its economy by 
adopting federal standards in imposing criminal sanctions 
against state employers who knowingly employ aliens who have 
no federal right to employment within the country; ... [t]hus 
absent congressional action, § 2805 would not be an invalid 
state incursion on federal power. (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
1d. at 354·56. 
27. "[Tlhere are questions of construction of Section 2805(a) to be settled before a 
determination is appropriate whether, as construed, Section 2805(a) can be enforced with· 
out impairing federal superintendence of the field covered by the INA." N.L.R.B. v. 
Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1184, quoting De Canas v. Bica, 4'24 U.S. 361, 363. 
28. See note 26 supra. Justice Brennan notes that California is codifying federal 
policies and regulations by adopting them in an attrJmpt to "strengthen its economy." 
Since the impact of § 2805 in immigration is speculati.'e and indirect, it is not an unconsti· 
tutional infringement on congressional power. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 at 365. The 
Ninth Circuit, here, has stated that the Board's reasoning "best furthers the policies 
underlying the immigration laws." N.L.R.B. v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1183. It is arguable 
that Board policy would also not conflict with an interpretation of § 2806 which was 
constitutional. 
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the same manner as other employees so defined by section 2(3) 
of the LMRA.29 Additionally, both circuits expressly allow the 
employer the right to seek modification of the Board's orders 
should it become apparent in the future that the order conflicts 
with the policies of the various immigration acts.30 
E. CONCLUSION 
The LMRA boardly defines who is an employee by listing 
certain exceptions to that definition.3t The NLRB has consis-
tently determined that since illegal aliens are not listed among 
those exceptions, they are fully protected under the provisions of 
the LMRA.3z The Ninth Circuit in Apollo joins the Seventh Cir-
cuit in affirming the Board's analysis. The Ninth Circuit now 
extends that analysis beyond representation proceedings to full 
remedial rights afforded employees by the Act, including rein-
statement with back pay to remedy unfair labor practices. Nei-
ther the Seventh nor the Ninth Circuits have reached the ques-
tion of whether the Board should conform its rules and practices 
to accomodate the underlying policies of other acts administered 
by other administrative agencies. It is not surprising that the 
circuits and the Board are in such agreement; but it is surprising 
that this rule has taken so long to be recognized. 
The rationale of this case is best expressed by Judge Ken-
nedy's concurrence: "If the [LMRA] were inapplicable to work-
ers who are illegal aliens, we would leave helpless the very persons 
who most need protection from exploitative e'mployer practices 
such as occurred in this case."33 Hopefully, when Apollo's holding 
becomes widely known, these most exploited employees will find 
it possible to assert their rights without fear of losing their jobs 
or their lives. 
Kevin S. Robinson 
29. 604 F.2d at 1183. 
30. Id, at 1184, citing N.L.R.B. v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d at 359. 
31. See note 6 supra. 
32. See notes 3 and 15 and., accompanying text. 
33. N.L.R.B. v. Apollo, 604 F.2d at 1184. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also 
Ortega, Plight of the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A.J. 251 (1972). Because of a fear of 
deportation and other reprisals, it is lesB likely that illegal aliens will be able to invoke 
the mechanisms of the Act to stop such exploitative employer practices. Mike Yuvosek & 
Sons, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 148 (1976); Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public 
Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63 (1977). 
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VII. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW 
In NLRB v. Machinist Local 1327, International Association 
of Machinists, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit 
held that union provisions imposing a continuing obligation on 
former members to honor a primary picket line is a valid restric-
tion on members' rjghts to resign and fines may lawfully be im-
posed for violation of this obligation. 
This case stemmed from the union's imposition of fines on 
its members who resigned during a strike and returned to work 
in violation of the union's constitution. The Ninth Circuit denied 
enforcement to the Board which found that the union had vio-
lated NLRA section 8(b)(1)(A),' 29 U.S.C. section 158(b)(1)(A). 
The constitution's provision stated that the acceptance of em-
ployment during a strike or lockout constituted improper conduct 
by a member. It further provided that resignation would not re-
lieve that member of the obligation to refrain from accepting 
employment for the. duration of the strike or lockout. Members 
were twice informed that the might be fined for violating the 
provision. 
The Board, in a three to two decision, held that the provision 
did not justify the fine and, as a result, the union violated section 
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act which provides that it is unfair labor prac-
tice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce 
employees in the exercise of their organizational rights, including 
the right of a member to resign from the union. After an effective 
resignation, the union has no more control over the former mem-
ber than it does over any other non-member. The Board thus 
found that the provision sought to unlawfully regulate the post-
resignation conduct of former members. 
A proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), however, states that the sec-
tion shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe 
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retnetion of union 
membership. It was this exception to section 8(b)(1)(A) that the 
1. "These sections in brief provide that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor 
organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights of 
self organization and collective bargaining, or to discriminate against employees on the 
basis of union membership; or to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate 
against an employee." 583 F.2d 1095, 1095 n.1. 
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Ninth Circuit majority focused on in refusing to enforce the Board 
order. Drawing on the opinion of the Board's dissenting members, 
the Court found that the union's provision was a contractual 
restriction on the member's right to resign and not an unlawful 
regulation of post-resignation conduct. 
Because the Supreme Court, in Booster Lodge No. 405, Int'l 
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 412-U.S. 84 (1973), expressly de-
clined to consider the allowable extent to which a union may re-
strict a member's right to resign, the Ninth Circuit considered 
the validity of the union constitution's provision. Although the 
provision permitted resignation by a member, it limited the ef-
fect of a resignation occurring during or immediately preceding a 
strike to protect the union against strikebreaking. Because the 
ability to discipline strikebreakers is essential to a union's ef-
fectiveness as bargaining agent, resignation does not relieve 
the resigner from the existing duty to refrain from strikebreak-
ing. 
The court found the union's provision enforceal?le as a rea-
sonable regulation falling within the scope of the 8(b)(1)(A) pro-
viso. Over a vigorous dissent, the majority relied on the fact that 
the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A) makes no distinction between acts done 
while a member and those acts done while not a member. Under 
the dissent's view, however, once membership is resigned, an 
employee again becomes fully protected by section 7 and any 
imposition of fines for working during a strike would violate sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A). 
In Lewis v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), the court 
held that the Board need not defer to an arbitration award which 
is repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act; and em-
ployees do not violate the principle of exclusive representation 
when they file unfair labor practice charges to force an employer 
to fulfill its statutory duty to bargain. 
Employees who were discharged as a result of the unilateral 
introduction of a production quota system filed unfair labor 
practice charges alleging that the company violated sections 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. These 
violations occurred because the employer imposed the quota sys-
tem without first bargaining with the Union. Additionally, the 
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employer forbade union representation at counseling and disci-
plinary sessions, another unilateral change. The Ninth Circuit 
held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
defer to the arbitration process where the arbitrators ignored 
well-established principles relating to the duty to bargain collec-
tively over terms and conditions of employment. Production 
quota systems and disciplinary sanctions come within 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The court concluded that the 
union's access to the grievance procedure to challenge the quota 
system did not constitute adequate bargaining. Bargaining be-
tween the company and the union must precede the decision to 
take action relating to ,a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Where, as here, there was no bargaining involved, the employees 
did not interfere with the union's bargaining position nor seek to 
bargain directly with the company in violation of the union's ex-
clusive representation rights. The employers sought only to re-
quire the company to fulfill its statutory duty to bargain. Under 
these circumstances, NLRA section 9(a) does not forbid employ-
ees from filing unfair labor practice charges. 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's finding that the com-
pany's denial of union representation at employee "counseling" 
sessions constituted a violation of section 8(a)(1). However, it 
denied enforcement of the Board's order that the company allow 
union representation in a disciplinary session where an employee 
is merely informed of action to be taken. The right of representa-
tion arises when a significant purpose of the interview is to ob-
tain facts from the employee to support disciplinary action 
which is being seriously considered. Where an employee is not 
subject to an interrogation but i,s merely investigated or in-
formed of a disciplinary action, there is no right to union 
representation. 
Finally, the court upheld the Board's reinstatement order 
since the loss of employment stemmed directly from an unlawful 
refusal to bargain. 
In Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 
857 (9th Cir. Mar. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held that a trial 
court has authority to stay adjudication of Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) claims pending arbitration of related contract 
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claims where to do so would be efficient for its docket and where 
the arbitration is proceeding efficiently. 
Based upon an employer's failure to pay time-and-a-half for 
work over forty hours per week, employees filed suit involving 
both a violation of the FLSA and a breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Ninth Circuit held that the district 
court correctly stayed the action pending arbitration provided for 
in the collective bargaining agreement. The court held that the 
contract claim was arbitrable, but the FLSA claim was not, since 
the contract expressly limited recovery to six months while the 
statute allowed recovery for two years of prior violations. 
The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court for a de-
termination of whether a stay of the FLSA claim would promote 
a just and efficient determination of the case, considering both 
the need to conserve judicial resources and the need for an expe-
ditious resolution of the FLSA claims. In determining that the 
employer/appellee had no right to a stay under the federal Ar-
bitration Act, the court distinguished a prior case, Beckley v. 
Teyssier, 332 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1964), which held FLSA claims 
arbitrable because they grow out of the employer-employee rela-
tionship and, therefore, necessarily involve application and in-
terpretation of contract provisions. Unlike Beckley, the court felt 
that the substantial differences in coverage between the contract 
arbitration provisions in Leyva and the FLSA revealed that the 
parties did not intend to substitute arbitration procedures for 
the enforcement of statutory rights. Second, the court looked to 
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the distinction between statu-
tory and contractual rights in Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thomp-
son, 405 U.S. 228 (1972). 
Thus, despite the general rule that arbitration clauses 
should be broadly construed, the court of appeal held that con-
tracts which provide for arbitration of contract disputes should 
not be read to require arbitration of statutory claims absent ex-
press provision for such arbitration. 
The court concluded that the district court might order a 
stay of such claims pending arbitration of the contract claims 
under its power to control its own docket and to provide for the 
prompt and efficient determination of its cases. The court de-
clined to address the issue of whether it would be bound by the 
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arbitrator's conclusions. Additionally, the district court should 
consider conditioning any stay on satisfactory assurances that 
the arbitration is proceeding with diligence and efficiency. 
In NLRB v. International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural Rein-
forcing And Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 75, 583 F.2d 1094 
(9th Cir. Oct. 1978), possible discriminatory motive was held ir-
relevant where action taken by the union was a non-discretion-
ary contractual duty and where prior breach of that duty was 
necessary to meet temporary, exigent circumstances. 
This action arose out of a discrepancy in placement referral 
procedures allowed under local and international union con-
tracts. An iron worker charged the local union with a violation of 
sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 
158(b)(1)(A) and 158(b)(2), for its refusal to refer him to a job 
for which he had been requested by name. Under the interna-
tional contract, employers could select ironworkers of their 
choosing, regardless of the worker's place on the local hiring 
hall's out-of-work list. Under the local contract, however, em-
ployers were required to hire workers from the top of the out-of-
work lists, except for "Group A" workers who had been within 
the local jurisdiction for four years or longer. Appellee ironworker 
was a "Group B" worker who had been requested by name by a 
subcontractor subject to a local union contract, bound by the 
top-of-the-list referral policy. The union refused to refer appellee 
to the job, pursuant to the local contract. 
The National Labor Relations Board found this refusal to be 
a violation of the Act, despite the contractual provisions because 
of possible animus by the union. It held that even though the 
union was not contractually required to refer appellee to the job, 
if the union used the contract as a pretext I10t to refer him, then 
it violated the Act. 
The Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order. 
Refusal to refer an employee on mere "arbitrary" or "irrelevant" 
grounds or because of animus toward an employee violates sec-
tions 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) only where the action of the union is 
discretionary. A discretionary action becomes an improper exer-
cise of discretion if based on an improper motive. Where a union 
is bound by a contract, no exercise of discretion is involved. Fur-
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thermore, the contract provisions relating to "Group A" and 
"Group B" workers were not rights belonging to the local union 
which it could waive. On the contrary, they are non-waivable 
representative rights of the union's members. A "waiver" of 
these rights would constitute a violation of the union's duty to 
its members. Additionally, the union's allowing the employer to 
retain a crew for one month without use of the out-of-work list 
involved an emergency situation and such violations could not 
be the basis for requiring an additional breach. 
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